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Abstract
The thesis includes three papers:
1. Limited Arbitrage Analysis of CDS Basis Trading
By modeling time-varying funding costs and demand pressure as the limits to arbi-
trage, the paper shows that assets with identical cash-flows have not only different
expected returns, but also different expected returns in excess of funding costs. I
solve the model in closed-form to show that the arbitrage on the CDS and corporate
bond market is a risky arbitrage. The sign of the expected excess return of the ar-
bitrage is decided by the sign and size of market frictions rather than the observed
price discrepancy. The size and risk of the arbitrage excess return are increasing
in market friction levels and assets’ maturities. High levels of market frictions also
destruct the positive predictability of credit spread term structure on credit spread
changes. Results from the empirical section support the above-mentioned model
predictions.
2. General Equilibrium Analysis of Stochastic Benchmarking
This paper applies a closed-form continuous-time consumption-based general equi-
librium model to analyze the equilibrium implications when some agents in the
economy promise to beat a stochastic benchmark at an intermediate date. For very
risky benchmark, these agents increase volatility and risk premium in the equilib-
rium. On the other hand, when they promise to beat less risky benchmark, they
decrease volatility and risk premium in the equilibrium. In both cases, the degree
of effect is state-dependent and stock price rises.
3. Institutional Asset Pricing with Heterogenous Belief (Co-authored)
We propose an equilibrium asset pricing model in which investors with heteroge-
neous beliefs care about relative performance. We find that the relative performance
concern leads agents to trade more similarly, which has two effects. First, similar
trading directly decreases volatility. Second, similar trading decreases the impact
of the dominant agents. When the economy is extremely good or bad, the sec-
ond effect is dominant so that the relative performance concern enlarges the excess
volatility caused by heterogeneous beliefs. When the first effect is dominant, which
corresponds to a normal economy, the volatility is lower than without the relative
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performance concern. Moreover, this paper shows that the relative performance
concern also influences investors’ holdings, stock prices and risk premia.
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1 Limited Arbitrage Analysis of CDS Basis Trading
Abstract
By modeling time-varying funding costs and demand pressure as the limits to arbi-
trage, the paper shows that assets with identical cash-flows have not only different
expected returns, but also different expected returns in excess of funding costs. I
solve the model in closed-form to show that the arbitrage on the CDS and corporate
bond market is a risky arbitrage. The sign of the expected excess return of the ar-
bitrage is decided by the sign and size of market frictions rather than the observed
price discrepancy. The size and risk of the arbitrage excess return are increasing
in market friction levels and assets’ maturities. High levels of market frictions also
destruct the positive predictability of credit spread term structure on credit spread
changes. Results from the empirical section support the above-mentioned model
predictions.
1.1 Introduction
As summarized in Gromb and Vayanos (2010), costs or demand shocks faced by
arbitrageurs can prevent them from eliminating mis-pricings on the markets and
therefore generate market anomalies. My model illustrates how the interaction of
time-varying funding cost and demand pressure faced by arbitrageurs results in two
assets with identical payoffs having different expected excess returns. This result
implies that taking opposite positions on these two assets is a risky arbitrage that is
expected to earn profit in excess of funding costs. I then use the arbitrage between
CDS and corporate bonds as an example to show how funding costs and demand
pressures determine the expected excess return of risky arbitrage and change the
credit spreads term structure’s predictability on future credit spread. Finally, the
empirical section lends support to several major theoretical results.
I explain the riskiness of arbitraging on two defaultable bonds with identical cash-
flows as the result of the interaction of funding illiquidity and market illiquidity.
Under a continuous-time demand-based framework in which risk-averse arbitrageurs
trade on two markets with identical defaultable bonds to meet demand pressure
posed by local investors, the presence of demand pressure results in arbitrageurs re-
quiring risk premium for the positions they take. Without other frictions, demand
pressure alone doesn’t generate pricing discrepancies between assets with identical
cash-flows. Arbitrageurs also face time-varying funding costs on the two markets,
which under certain conditions result in the two assets having different risk expo-
9
sures and carrying different levels of risk premium. The co-existence of time-varying
funding cost and demand pressure makes taking opposite positions on the two mar-
kets a risky arbitrage. As shown in the model, without any one of these two sources
of friction, the arbitrage doesn’t generate expected excess profit.
I solve the model in closed-form under two cases. The first case assumes con-
stant demand pressure from local investors while the second case assumes off-setting
stochastic demand pressure. In the latter case, even if the arbitrageurs can take the
exact opposite positions on the two markets in equilibrium so that they are com-
pletely protected from the risk of defaults, they still have non-zero exposures to
other risk factors. Applying the results to the CDS and corporate bond markets
suggests CDS basis trading is in fact risky arbitrage and it is reasonable for the
CDS basis to deviate from its theoretical frictionless value of zero under severe mar-
ket frictions. The expected excess return of the risky arbitrage depends on market
frictions rather than the level of the price discrepancy. The model also shows the
arbitrageurs sometimes magnify rather than correct price distortion under market
frictions and offers a number of results on term structure properties.
Empirical results support the model predictions. Using Markit CDX and iBoxx
Indices data and corporate bond data from TRACE, I show that basis trading is
exposed to systematic risk factors, while the interaction of funding cost and market
liquidity have predictive power on abnormal basis trading returns. As predicted by
the model, the predictability of credit spread term structure slope on future credit
spread change may turn from positive to negative when market frictions are high. I
also find the size and volatility of realized basis trading excess return is increasing
in the degree of market frictions. Moreover, the size of realized basis trading excess
return is increasing in underlying maturity.
In early theoretical literature, Tuckman and Vila (1990) show that exogenous price
discrepancies between two assets with identical cash-flows do not necessarily cre-
ate arbitrage opportunities if there’s shorting-selling cost. As show in Gromb and
Vayanos (2010), without other frictions, the discrepancies between the expected re-
turns of the two assets should compensate exactly for the funding costs so that an
arbitrageur is still expected to earn zero excess return. In contrary, my model sug-
gests arbitrageur can earn a risky profit even after adjusting for the funding costs
if the funding costs are time-varying and arbitrageur faces demand pressure.
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The demand pressure faced by the arbitrageurs is another important source of mar-
ket friction that contributes to the rise of market anomalies. Investors other than
arbitrageurs can have endogenous demand shocks that arise via different channels,1
but a number of papers have focused on the pricing implications given exogenous
demand shocks as I do. These theoretical demand-based papers include Garleanu,
et.al.(2009), Naranjo (2009) and Vayanos and Villa (2009). By assuming exogenous
underlying asset prices, Garleanu, et.al.(2009) and Naranjo (2009) solve derivative
prices endogenously to show that exogenous demand shocks and frictions in arbi-
trageurs’ trading can drive derivative prices away from conventional prices implied
by the no-arbitrage conditions. Naranjo (2009) considers extra funding cost faced
by arbitrageurs as the friction limiting her ability to eliminate price discrepancies
on the futures and underlying markets. However, he assumed the underlying asset’s
price as exogenously given, so the market frictions only have impact on the futures
price but not on the underlying market, which is unrealistic as derivative markets’
trading do have impact on underlying price.
My paper is the closest to Vayanos and Vila (2009) in that prices in both legs of
the arbitrage are endogenized so frictions on one market affect all markets. Vayanos
and Villa (2009) study arbitrage across different Treasury bonds maturities, i.e. as-
sets with different cash-flows, and there’s no other frictions than the demand shocks
from other preferred habitat investors. However, my paper introduces an additional
friction, which is the time-varying funding costs, to show that two assets with iden-
tical cash-flows can earn different expected excess return, which implies profitability
yet risk for a cross-market arbitrage trade. The two assets with identical cash-flows
are two defaultable bonds, one represents corporate bond, while the other repre-
sents a synthetic corporate bond position created by writing a CDS protection and
default-free lending.2 Trading corporate bonds through repo and reverse-repo gen-
erates additional funding costs that are sensitive to default intensity of the bonds.
Therefore I model the funding costs as functions of default intensity. Although the
assumption on funding costs are not fully endogenized, a clear motivation in Ap-
pendix 1.A along with empirical findings by Gorton and Metrick (2010) justify this
assumption, which is further supported by a recent paper by Mitchell and Pulvino
(2011), which illustrates the consequence of funding liquidity failure on arbitrage
activities from practitioners’ perspectives.
1See Gromb and Vayanos (2010) for details.
2The equivalence of synthetic corporate bond and writing CDS plus lending will be illustrated
in the next section.
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I apply the model’s implications on CDS basis trading, which turned out to be
a risky arbitrage activity in the 2007/08 crisis. Credit default swap (CDS) is an
OTC contract in which one party pays the other party a periodical fee (the CDS
premium) for the protection against credit events of an underlying bond, in which
case the protection seller pays the protection buyer for the loss from the underlying
bond. The CDS market offers hedgers and speculators to trade credit risks in a
relatively easy way. It is a fast growing market with vast market volume. The ex-
act way to trade CDS has experienced some significant changes in the recent years
following hot debates over the role it plays in the 2007/08 financial crisis. In the
past, the two parties of a CDS trade agree on the CDS premium that makes the
CDS contract having zero value at origination. Then as conditions change in the
life of this contract, it has a marked-to-market value that is not zero. Following the
implementation of the so-called CDS Big-Bang regulations on the North American
markets in April 2009, the CDS premia are fixed at either 100bps or 500bps, and the
two parties exchange an amount of cash at origination to reflect the true value of
the contract. For instance, if the reasonable CDS premium should be 200bps, then
the protection buyer pays the protection writer a certain amount of money at the
beginning, and then pays CDS premium at 100bps each period. This is certainly a
change in order to make the market more standardized and more liquid, however,
the CDS market is still very opaque and illiquid.
Theoretical papers such as Duffie (1999) and Hull and White (2000) show the parity
between CDS price and credit spread under the no-arbitrage condition, i.e. investors
who hold a defaultable bond and short a CDS (buy protection) on this bond is effec-
tively holding a default-free bond and thus should earn the risk free return. In other
words, the CDS basis, which is CDS premium minus the credit spread, should be
zero if basis trading earns only risk free return. Empirical works including Hull, et.
al.(2004), Blanco, et. al.(2005) and Zhu (2006) using relatively early data support
this zero basis hypothesis.
However, practitioners observe positive or negative basis at times and many in-
vestors engage in basis trading. Buying a bond and CDS protection is known as
negative basis trading, while shorting a bond and writing CDS protection is called
positive basis trading. Meanwhile, recent work by Garleanu and Pedersen (2011)
and Fontana (2010) document large negative basis persisted from the summer of
2007 to early 2009. Figure 1.13 shows that during the 2007/08 crisis the CDS
3All figures and tables for this chapter are listed in Appendix 1.C.
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basis become very negative for a long period, which contradicts text-book arbitrage
argument, yet negative basis trading still lost money even at quite negative CDS
basis level. In this paper, I reveal the risky arbitrage nature of CDS basis trading in
closed-form and show the expected excess return of basis trading depends on market
frictions rather than the level of CDS basis.
To justify the deviation from the law of one price on the CDS and corporate bond
markets, Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) attribute two otherwise identical assets’ dif-
ferent exposures to risk factors to the different level of exogenous margin requirement
on the two markets. Empirical work by Fontana (2010) finds that funding costs vari-
ables are important in explaining CDS basis changes, while Bai and Collin-Dufresne
(2010) explain cross-sectional variations in CDS basis with funding liquidity risk,
counterparty risk and collateral quality. However, their result concerns only the
changes in CDS basis, which according to my model doesn’t determine the expected
excess return of basis trading in the presence of funding costs. My paper is also
related to a number of empirical works in explaining credit spread and CDS price
movements such as: Collin-Dufresne, et. al.(2001), Elton, et. al.(2001), Huang and
Huang (2003), Blanco, et. al.(2005), Tang and Yan (2007), and Ellul, et. al.(2009)
among others. A recent work of Giglio (2011) proposes a novel way of inferring
implied joint distribution of financial institution’s default risk from the CDS basis,
which shows the role of counterparty risk in widening CDS basis.
The next section introduces the model set-up before Section 1.3 and Section 1.4
solves the model under two cases and provides a number of results on the expected
excess return of basis trading and the term structure properties of credit spreads.
Empirical study is carried out in Section 1.5 to support theoretical results. Finally,
Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 The Markets
In a continuous time economy with a horizon from zero to infinity, there exists two
defaultable bond markets, named C and D respectively. On each market, there’s
a continuum of zero-coupon4 defaultable bonds with face value of 1 and time to
maturity τ , τ ∈ (0, T ]. Denote the time t prices of these bonds by P ct (τ) and P dt (τ)
respectively. When applying equilibrium results to explain real world phenomenon,
4The coupon rate is assumed to be zero so as to derive closed form solutions.
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I regard market C as the cash market, which corresponds to the corporate bond
market, and market D as the derivative market, which corresponds to the CDS
market plus default-free lending.5
Assume all bonds on the two markets are issued by the same entity, which has
an exogenous default time T ′. Upon default, for all bonds on the two markets, a
bond holder loses L fraction of a bond’s market value. To keep the model tractable,
I assume L is constant and the same across all bonds. The above specification en-
sures that a bond with time to maturity τ on market C has identical cash-flows as
the bond with time to maturity τ on market D.6
Assume the default intensity (instantaneous default probability) of the bond en-
tity is λ˜+ λt, the stochastic part λt follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
7:
dλt = κλ(λ¯− λt)dt+ σλdBλ,t (1.1)
Where κλ, λ¯ and σλ are positive constants, and Bλ,t is a Brownian Motion. A
detailed description of stochastic default probability and doubly-stochastic default
time can be found in Duffie (2005).
Next, assume there’s a money market account that generates instantaneous return
at an exogenous short rate of rt, which also follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
drt = κr(r¯ − rt)dt+ σrdBr,t (1.2)
As mentioned earlier, the real world implication of the model refers positions on
market C as the cash bond positions, and positions on market D as the deriva-
5The equivalence between CDS plus default-free lending and synthetic defaultable bond position
is given at the end of this section.
6Although price discrepancies between similar assets can arise from small cash-flow discrepancies,
e.g. difference contract specifications, this model only aims to derive price discrepancies between
assets with identical cash-flows under market frictions. This aim is in line with other limited
arbitrage models.
7Under the assumption that λt follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, it is possible to have
λt < 0. Adding a positive λ˜ to the default intensity reduces the chance of having negative default
intensity λ˜ + λt, but still cannot exclude negative default intensity completely. To avoid negative
default intensity, I assume that λt is mean-reverting with square-root diffusion term in Appendix
1.D., which shows that the model still has closed-form solution in the constant demand pressure case
and the main conclusion on the expected excess return of basis trading still stands. However, in the
stochastic demand pressure case, the model cannot be solved in closed-form under this alternative
assumption. Therefore, I still present the model under the simple Ornstein-Uhlenbeck assumption
for λt.
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tive (synthetic bond) positions created by CDS positions and default-free borrow-
ing/lending in practice. In early literature such as Duffie (1999), the equivalence
between buying defaultable bond and writing CDS plus default-free lending is best
illustrated using floating rate notes (FRN). For instance, the cash flow of a default-
able FRN is the same as the cash flow from writing CDS protection plus the cash
flow of a default-free FRN.
Without using FRNs, the equivalence still holds in the following way: in the absence
of default, the zero-coupon defaultable bond holder gets the face value of 1 dollar at
maturity, and upon default, gets the default-free present value of this 1 dollar but
loses L fraction of the bond’s pre-default market value; As for the synthetic default-
able bond position created by CDS and default-free lending, assume the CDS has
the same maturity as the defaultable bond and the CDS premium is paid up-front
so that unless there’s a default, there’s no cash-flow between the two parties except
at the origination of the contract. Also assume that in the default-free lending, the
lender lends the default-free present value of 1 dollar to the borrower, who pays back
the face value of 1 dollar at the maturity of the CDS, or the default-free present
value of 1 dollar at anytime before the maturity. Therefore, if there’s no default,
synthetic position’s total payoff at maturity is the 1 dollar from the default-free
lending at maturity. If there’s default, the CDS position pays a fraction L of the
defaultable bond’s pre-default market value, and the default-free lending position
retrieves the present value of the 1 dollar lent. So the synthetic position’s total
payoff is the default-free present value of 1 dollar minus L fraction of the bond’s
pre-default market value. Therefore, the cash-flow from the synthetic position is the
same as that of a defaultable bond, whether there’s default or not.
When applying model’s predictions to discuss real world phenomenon, define nega-
tive basis trading as buying cash bond C and selling derivative bond D. This corre-
sponds to buying corporate bond through borrowing and buying CDS protection in
practice. In the contrary, positive basis trading is defined as buying derivative bond
D and selling cash bond C. This corresponds to shorting corporate bond through
reverse repo and writing CDS protection.
1.2.2 The Agents and Demand Pressure
The economy consists of two types of agents: local investors and arbitrageurs. Lo-
cal investors are segmented into the two markets. Denote the cash market local
investors’ aggregate amount invested for maturity τ by zct (τ), and the derivative
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market local investors’ aggregate amount invested for maturity τ by zdt (τ). Local
investors can only invest in their own markets.
In reality, large excess demand or supply from local investors exist on both the
CDS market and the corporate bond market. Investors have different motives to
trade on the CDS or the corporate bond markets, so it is reasonable to assume they
are segmented.8 The excess supply of corporate bonds could come from regulation
restricted fire-sale of bonds by insurance companies or simply a flight to quality
during crisis. The excess demand for corporate bonds can come from large inflows
into bond market funds. On the other hand, excess demand or supply on the CDS
markets can come from the hedging demand from banks who hold bonds/loans or
those who gain exposure to default risk from other credit derivative market posi-
tions. Sometimes the local investors’ demand on the two markets can be exactly the
opposite. As documented by Mitchell and Pulvino (2011) and also in other prac-
titioners’ articles, some banks that hold corporate bonds and CDS protection on
these underlying bonds unwound their positions after the Lehman Collapse in order
to free up more cash. Their trades would have introduced negative zct and positive
zdt with the same absolute value in the model. In this scenario, the arbitrageurs face
exactly the opposite demand pressures from the two markets. A special case of my
model investigates this scenario in detail in the following sections.
There’s an infinite number of risk-averse arbitraguers that form a continuum with
measure 1 who can trade any amount on the two bond markets, and therefore ren-
ders the prices arbitrage free. At any time t, the continuum of arbitrageurs are born
in time t and die in t + dt, so arbitrageur’s utility is to trade off the instantaneous
mean and variance of their payoff. The arbitrageurs have zero wealth when they’re
born, i.e. an arbitrageur’s time t wealth Wt = 0. Denote the arbitrageur’s amount
invested in the cash market for maturity τ by xct(τ) and the amount invested in the
derivative market for maturity τ by xdt (τ).
Assume both markets have zero supply. At equilibrium, the arbitrageurs and local
investors clear both markets, i.e. xct(τ) + z
c
t (τ) = 0 and x
d
t (τ) + z
d
t (τ) = 0.
A positive zit, i = c, d corresponds to local investors’ excess demand and suggests the
arbitrageurs have a pressure to sell in equilibrium. On the other hand, a negative
8Like in Vayanos and Vila (2009), it is a simplification to assume that local investors are seg-
mented, and to consider those who can trade on both markets as arbitrageurs.
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zit corresponds to local investors’ excess supply and the arbitrageurs have a pressure
to buy in equilibrium.
In general, assume the aggregate demand from local investors are linear functions
of a stochastic process zt:
zit(τ) = θ¯
i(τ) + θi(τ)zt (1.3)
dzt = κz(z¯ − zt)dt+ σzdBz,t (1.4)
where i = c, d. θ¯i(τ) and θi(τ) are functions of τ . The sign of θ¯i(τ) and θi(τ) will
be specified later. So far there are three Brownian motions in the model, namely
Bλ,t, Br,t and Bz,t. To derive closed form solutions, assume they are independent.
The excess demand or supply from local investors faced by the arbitrageur is of-
ten called demand pressure. The presence of demand pressure has implications on
asset pricing because the arbitraguers, who provide liquidity by clearing the markets,
need to be compensated for the risk exposure they get by doing so. As summarized
by Gromb and Vayanos (2010), several kinds of demand pressure effects on treasury
bonds, futures and options markets have been studied.9 Without other frictions,
demand pressure alone doesn’t generate pricing discrepancies between assets with
identical cash-flows. My model introduce the time-varying funding costs described
in the next section as the source of friction that work together with demand pressure
to cause pricing discrepancies. The inclusion of this funding cost also distinguishes
my model from the above mentioned ones.
1.2.3 Funding Costs
In the real world, buying defaultable bonds through borrowing (using repo) and
short-selling through reverse-repo incurs funding costs in excess of the short rate. If
one buys defaultable bond through borrowing, she can only borrow at a rate higher
than rt. Similarly, if one shorts defaultable bond, she incurs short-selling cost.
The additional borrowing cost and short-selling cost are called funding costs in this
model. The presence of these funding costs represents a source of market friction.
Assume that the funding costs hit(τ), i = c, d, are exogenous linear functions of λt,
the stochastic part of default intensity:
hit(τ) = α
i(τ)λt + δ
i(τ) i = c, d 0 < αi < L (1.5)
9By Vayanos and Villa (2009), Naranjo (2008), and Garleanu, et.al. (2009) respectively
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Appendix 1.A provides motivations for this assumption10 by solving for the op-
timal hair-cuts applied in repo and reverse-repo transactions. Given exogenous
interest rates, the cost of borrowing using the defaultable bond as collateral in a
repo transaction is shown to be increasing in the default intensity risk λt. This is
because the amount that can be borrowed using the bond as collateral is decreasing
in λt. Therefore, when λt is higher, the borrower has to borrow more at the un-
collateralized rate, and therefore incur more borrowing costs. The short-selling cost
is also shown to be increasing in λt. In a reverse-repo transaction, the short-seller
of the bond will be asked to put more cash collateral to borrow the bond for sale
when λt is higher because the bond is more risky which makes the short-seller more
likely to default on the obligation to return the bond. As a result, the short-seller
lends more at collateralized rate, less at uncollateralized rate, therefore earns less
interest from the proceeds of the short-selling (incurs more short-selling costs). The
above rationale is supported by empirical evidence found by Gorton and Metrick
(2010) that the repo hair-cut is increasing in the riskiness of collaterals. Mitchell
and Pulvino (2011) also justify the above assumption from a practitioner’s perspec-
tive. This funding cost models both the borrowing cost and short-selling cost, so it
reduces arbitrageur’s wealth regardless of the direction of her trades.
When making the analogy between derivative market D and the CDS market, if
trading on the CDS market is frictionless, then αd(τ) and δd(τ) can be set as ze-
ros. However, although the CDS market used to have extremely low funding costs
due to its low margin requirement, it is not frictionless. During the 2007/08 crisis,
counterparty risk in CDS contract led to the raise in margin requirement on the
CDS market. Counterparty risk refers to the possibility that protection writers may
default on their obligation to pay the buyers upon the default of the underlying,
or the possibility that protection buyers default on their obligation to pay the CDS
premium. CDS protection writers were asked to put more collaterals than before,
while protection buyers were asked to pay CDS premium up-front. These changes
made CDS having comparable funding costs as trading corporate bonds. An alter-
native way for CDS protection writers to provide collateral that was widely used in
practice is for them to buy a CDS on their own names for the protection buyer from
a third party. In this way, if the CDS writer defaults, the buyer can still get paid by
the third party. Therefore, the CDS protection writer incurs additional periodical
cost that equals to the CDS premium on themselves. If the CDS writer’s default
10The above specifications imply symmetric borrowing and short-selling costs. The model can
be easily adapted to include asymmetric borrowing cost and short-selling costs.
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can only be triggered by the underlying’s default, then this additional cost should
be increasing in the underlying’s default intensity. So for the derivative market D,
it’s also reasonable to assume funding costs as an increasing function of λt.
1.2.4 The Arbitrageurs’ Optimization Problem


































|xdt (τ)|hdt (τ)dτdt (1.7)
The arbitrageur trades off instantaneous expected payoff and variance of payoff. In
the above dynamic budget constraint, Wt is the representative arbitrageur’s wealth
at time t and is assumed to be zero. γ is her risk aversion coefficient. Ignoring
τ , xct is the amount she invests into cash bond C and x
d
t is the amount she in-
vests into derivative bond D. The first term on the right hand side of the dynamic
budget constraint gives the amount earned by her money market account. The ar-
bitrageur’s wealth is also affected by changes in the cash and derivative bond prices,
as well as jumps upon default. Additionally, since the arbitrageur is born with zero
wealth, she can only buy through borrowing or sell through short-selling. There-
fore, trading on the cash and derivative markets incurs funding cost at the rate of
hct(τ) and h
d
t (τ). These costs reduce arbitrageur’s wealth regardless of the direction
of her trades, so the costs are multiplied by the absolute value of arbitrageur’s trade.
Before presenting the equilibrium results, I first derive the arbitrageur’s F.O.C.s
so as to provide intuition and definition that facilitate the discussions in latter parts
of this section. I then solve the equilibrium bond prices in closed form for two cases
separately. Under each case, the closed form solutions clearly reveal the sign and
size of the expected excess return of basis trading under market frictions, and also
offer new properties of credit spreads.
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1.2.5 The First Order Conditions
Lemma 1.1. Ignoring τ where it doesn’t cause confusion, the Arbitrageur’s F.O.C.s
are:
µct − rt − hct
∂|xct |
∂xct









µdt − rt − hdt
∂|xdt |
∂xdt









where µct and µ
d























are the market prices of risks, j = λ, r, z.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
The left hand side of the F.O.C.s is the instantaneous expected excess return, here-
after EER, and the right hand side is the risk premium. The EER is the expected
return of a bond in excess of the short rate and the funding cost. The EER equals
the risk premium which is given by the exposure to risk times the market price of
risk. By construction, bond C and bond D have the same exposure to the jump
risk of default, which carries market price of risk ΦJ,t. They also have exposures to
the other 3 risk factors, namely the default intensity risk factor λt, which carries
market price of risk Φλ,t, the short rate risk factor rt, which carries market price of
risk Φr,t and the demand shock risk factor zt, which carries market price of risk Φz,t.
The magnitudes of these exposures depend on equilibrium terms 1
P it
∂P it
∂j , i = c, d,
j = λ, r, z.
Subtracting the first F.O.C. from the second one gives the total expected excess
return of the so-called negative basis trade. In contrary, subtracting the second
F.O.C. from the first one gives the expected excess return of positive basis trade.
Formally, I make the following definition.
Definition 1.1. Negative basis trading (nbt) is defined as buying bond C and sell-
11For definition of µct and µ
d
t , see the Proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix B
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ing bond D for the same time-to-maturity, which corresponds to buying corporate
bond through borrowing and buying CDS protection in the real world; Positive basis
trading (pbt) is defined as selling bond C and buying bond D for the same time-to-
maturity, which corresponds to shorting corporate bond and writing CDS protection



























Based on the F.O.C.s, equilibrium results are solved using the market clearing con-
dition. On each market, the optimally derived quantities of the arbitrageurs plus
those from the local investors equals zero. To solve the model in closed-form, I make
further assumptions on the local investors demand and derive equilibrium results in
the following two cases.
1.3 Equilibrium Results 1: Under Constant Demand Pressure
In the first case, I assume that the local investors have constant demand on the two
markets. Recall the specification for the local investors’ demand zit(τ) in Equation
(1.3), this assumption implies θi(τ) = 0 and zit(τ) = θ¯
i(τ) = zi(τ), i = c, d. As-
suming local investors having constant demand removes the demand shock factor
zt from the model, I therefore conjecture that the bond prices to take the following
form:
P ct (τ) = e
−[Acλ(τ)λt+Acr(τ)rt+Cc(τ)] (1.14)
P dt (τ) = e
−[Adλ(τ)λt+Adr(τ)rt+Cd(τ)] (1.15)
where Aij(τ) and C
i(τ), i = c, d, j = λ, r, are functions of τ . To solve for the equi-
librium, take the above conjectured prices into the arbitrageurs F.O.C.s in Equation
(1.8) (1.9) and replace xit(τ) with −zi(τ) to reflect the market clearing condition in
the equilibrium: xit(τ) + z
i(τ) = 0, i = c, d.
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1.3.1 Solutions



























Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
Therefore, Acr(τ) = A
d
r(τ), prices on the two markets have the same coefficients
for the short rate risk. As for the coefficient for the default intensity risk, if local
investors’ demand on the two markets are in opposite directions, i.e. sign[zc(τ)] =
−sign[zd(τ)], then Acλ(τ) 6= Adλ(τ), the prices on the two markets have different co-
efficients for the default intensity risk λt, as long as at least one market has funding
cost that has non-zero sensitivity to the default intensity risk, i.e. αc(τ) 6= 0 or
αd(τ) 6= 0; if local investors’ demand on the two markets are in the same direction,
then prices on the two markets have different coefficients for the default intensity
risk if funding costs on the two markets have different sensitivity to the default
intensity risk, i.e. αc(τ) 6= αd(τ).
The prices’ sensitivities to risk factors have important implications on the discussion
of basis trading returns, which now can be derived by taking the solutions of Aij(τ)
into Equation (1.12) (1.13).
1.3.2 The Expected Excess Returns of Basis Trading
Although conventional wisdom suggests market frictions such as funding cost may
cause assets with identical cash-flows to have different prices, it is not clear whether
arbitrageurs are expected to earn positive excess return if they try to take advantage
from the price discrepancies. However, in this model, it is possible to derive the
expected excess return of basis trading in closed form and analyze its sign and size
in the following way:
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Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
Corollary 1.1. The sign of the expected excess return of basis trading has the fol-
lowing properties:
• Basis trading earns non-zero expected excess return, except for the follow-
ing three scenarios, : 1) αc(τ) = αd(τ) = 0; 2) αc(τ) = αd(τ) 6= 0 and
sign[zc(τ)] = sign[zd(τ)]; and 3) zc(τ) = zd(τ) = 0.
• When local investors are selling on both markets, or only buying moderate
amount on both markets, basis trading is expected to earn positive excess return
by buying on the market whose funding cost has higher sensitivity to default
intensity risk and selling on the other market.
• When local investors are buying in huge amount on both markets such that
prices have positive sensitivities to default intensity risk, basis trading is prof-
itable by buying on the market whose funding cost is less sensitive to default
intensity risk and selling on the other market.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
The first point suggests that basis trading is a risky arbitrage that earns non-zero
EER only when both funding cost friction and market liquidity friction are present.
Under scenario 1), funding costs on the two markets have no sensitivities to λt; un-
der scenario 2), they have the same sensitivities and arbitrageur takes the same side
of trade on the two markets, then the two assets carry the same exposures to the
default intensity risk factor, which results in them carrying the same risk premium.
Therefore, under both scenarios 1) and 2), buying on one market and selling on the
other results in zero aggregate exposure to risk factors and basis trading earns zero
EER. Under scenario 3), even if assets on the two markets may have different risk
exposures to default intensity risk, the market prices of risks are all zeros because
the arbitrageur doesn’t have to provide liquidity in equilibrium so all EERs should
be zero. Other than in the above mentioned three scenarios, basis trading is ex-
pected to earn non-zero return in excess of the funding costs, i.e. basis trading is
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expected to be profitable.
Intuitively, basis trading can earn positive expected excess return, i.e. make profit
after deducting funding costs, because the presence of demand pressure results in
arbitrageurs requiring risk premium for the positions they take. The time-varying
funding costs which are correlated with the underlying risk (default intensity risk)
on the two markets cause the two assets to have different risk exposures. The ag-
gregate risk exposure of buying on one market and selling the same quantity on the
other market is thus non-zero, and therefore earns non-zero expected excess return.
However, in reality, one can do basis trading in two ways: Buying on market C
while selling on market D, or buying on market D while selling on market C. The
second and third points in Corollary 1.1 concern the sign of basis trading EERs.
When local investors on the two markets are all selling, bonds on both markets carry
positive risk premia which compensates the arbitrageurs who are buying to provide
liquidity. The arbitageur is exposed to more default intensity risk on the market
with higher funding cost sensitivity to λt, therefore earns more default intensity risk
premium on this market. So buying bond on this market and selling on the other
generates positive expected excess return. For instance, if there’s funding cost on
corporate bond market but not on CDS market, i.e. αc > αd = 0, then if local
investors are selling on both markets, the model predicts negative basis trading to
be profitable even after deducting the funding costs. In the other case, when lo-
cal investors on the two markets are all buying moderate amount, bonds on both
markets carry negative risk premium. The market whose funding cost has higher
sensitivity to λt has lower sensitivity to the default intensity risk, therefore earns
less negative risk premium. So buying bond on this market and selling on the other
is expected to be profitable.
However, if local investors are buying too much on both markets, bonds also carry
negative default intensity risk premium but the market whose funding cost has lower
sensitivity to λt now has lower sensitivity to the default intensity risk, therefore earns
less negative risk premium. So buying bond on this market and selling on the other
is expected to be profitable. The difference here with the moderately positive local
investor demand case is that when local investors are buying too much, bond prices
become increasing in default intensity. This is true due to the assumption that bond
holders retain (1 − L) fraction of bond’s market value upon default. The compen-
sation to arbitrageur for providing liquidity in this case is for price to be increasing
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in default intensity so that she’s expected to gain more upon default when default
intensity is higher.
Corollary 1.2. The size of the risk exposure and expected excess return of basis
trading has the following properties:
• When sign(zc) = sign(zd), the size of basis trading’s risk exposure is increas-
ing in |αc − αd|.
• When sign(zc) = −sign(zd), the size of basis trading’s risk exposure is in-
creasing in (αc + αd).
• Size of basis trading EER is increasing in the volatility of default intensity.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
As mentioned above, the net exposure to default intensity risk depends on the
funding costs’ sensitivities to λt. When the local demands on the two markets
are in the same direction, the net exposure is determined by the difference of αc
and αd. But when the local investors’ demand are in opposite directions, the net
exposure depends on the sum of αc and αd. The size of EER of basis trading is
also increasing in σλ, which is not surprising as σλ is positively priced in both the
basis trading’s absolute net exposure to default intensity risk and the market price
of default intensity risk.
1.3.3 Implications on Credit Spread Term Structure and the Predictabil-
ity of Credit Spread
Earlier empirical works such as Bedendo et.al.(2007) found that the slope of the
credit spread term structure positively predicts future changes in credit spread. My
model supports this result when friction is moderate, but when there’s high level of
market friction, my model suggests that the positive predictability become negative.
To see this point in details, I first make the following definitions:
Definition 1.2. Credit spread is the difference between the yield to maturity of a
defaultable bond and the yield to maturity of a default-free bond of the same maturity.
Denote yields to maturity of the defaultable bond with time to maturity τ by Y ct (τ),
and the credit spread by CSct (τ).





There’s no default-free bond market in my model, but it is safe to conjecture that
a frictionless default-free bond market has default-free bond prices: DFt(τ) =
e−[Ar(τ)rt+Cdf (τ)],12 so that the yield to maturity of default-free bond can be de-
noted by Y dft (τ) = − logDFt(τ)/τ . Because the defaultable bond and default-free
bond have the same coefficient to short rate rt, therefore the credit spread term
structure CSt(τ) only has one time-varying risk factor λt.










where Cc(τ) and Cdf (τ) are functions of τ that do not matter in deriving the fol-
lowing results.
Bedendo et.al.(2007) run the following regression for credit spread of a certain ma-
turity τ and found the coefficient estimate ψ to be significantly positive, which
suggests the slope of credit spread term structure positively predicts future credit
spread changes.
CSt+∆τ (τ −∆τ)− CSt(τ) = ψ0 + ψ[CSt(τ)− CSt(τ −∆τ)] + t+∆τ (1.22)
According to my model, the coefficient ψ is calculated in closed-form and analyzed
in the following way:
Proposition 1.2. When ∆τ → 0, the regression coefficient ψ(τ) = F (τ)
1−F (τ)e−κλτ ,




• When there’s no friction, i.e. αc(τ) = 0 and zc(τ) = zd(τ) = 0, then ψ > 0.
The slope of credit spread term structure positively predicts future credit spread
changes.
• When local investors are selling large quantities and funding cost is very sen-
sitive to λt, i.e. z
c(τ) << 0, αc(τ) >> 0, then ψ < 0. The slope of credit
spread term structure negatively predicts future credit spread changes.
• ψ < 0 is more likely to happen to bonds with short time-to-maturities.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
Under standard set-up without the funding cost and demand pressure frictions, the
condition for ψ > 0 simplifies to L < eκλτ , which is always satisfied as L < 1 by as-
12For example, this can be derived from Vayanos and Vila (2009) by assuming arbitrageurs in
their model face no demand pressures from local investors.
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sumption. Therefore, the credit spread slope should always positively predict future
credit spread changes, which has been documented by Bedendo et.al.(2007) among
others. But new features in this model suggests that market frictions can distort
this predictability. The coefficient ψ can be either positive or negative depending on
market conditions. When local investors are selling large quantities on the corporate
bond market and funding cost is very sensitive to default intensity risk, the credit
spread slope may negatively predict future credit spread changes. In the empirical
section, this point is supported by data during the crisis in 2008.
Intuitively, similar to the argument of the expectation hypothesis of the interest
rate term structure, conventional thinking believes credit spread term structure
contains information of the expectation of future credit spread changes, i.e. positive
credit spread term structure slope implies that future default probability is likely to
increase, hence credit spread will increase. However, in the presence of large market
frictions, corporate bond prices reflect not only credit risk but also funding liquidity
and market liquidity risk, so credit spread term structure becomes less informative
about future credit spread changes.
To be more specific, the negative predictability of credit spread term structure slope
on future credit spread changes can be explained in the following way: if market
frictions are high and local bond market investors are selling, bonds with longer
time-to-maturity may become less favorable to use as collateral for borrowing due
to its higher sensitivity to risk factors. Therefore, although all bonds will be un-
dervalued, bonds with longer time-to-maturity will have higher credit spread (lower
price) than bonds with shorter time-to-maturity even if they carry the same default
risk information. The credit spread term structure is thus upward sloping. Since
the underpricing of bonds are caused by market frictions rather than default risk
factor fluctuation, the credit spread in the future is likely to decrease as bond prices
finally return to their fundamental level. Then empirical study can observe pos-
itive credit spread term structure followed by negative credit spread changes, i.e.
negative predictability.
1.4 Equilibrium Results 2: Under Off-setting Stochastic Demand
Pressure
Next, I relax the constant demand pressure assumption to allow local investors
to have stochastic demand. To keep the model linear and thus allow closed form
solutions, I make an additional assumption that the demand from local investors on
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the cash and derivative markets are exactly the opposite, i.e. −zdt (τ) = zct (τ). This
is equivalent to assuming:
zct (τ) = θ¯(τ) + θ(τ)zt (1.23)
zdt (τ) = −θ¯(τ)− θ(τ)zt (1.24)
The demand function is price in-elastic. If I assume the two demand pressures to be
exactly the opposite and price-elastic, the equilibrium prices can still be solved in
closed-form, but are very complicated that makes the discussions on assets returns
unclear, so results for that case are not presented.
1.4.1 Solutions
Given the above assumptions on local investors’ demand, the model has closed-
form solutions for the following two scenarios: 1) θ¯(τ) << 0 and θ(τ) < 0, and 2)
θ¯(τ) >> 0 and θ(τ) > 0. I conjecture that prices are exponential affine in the risk
factors:
P ct (τ) = e
−[Acλ(τ)λt+Acr(τ)rt+Acz(τ)zt+Cc(τ)] (1.25)
P dt (τ) = e
−[Adλ(τ)λt+Adr(τ)rt+Adz(τ)zt+Cd(τ)] (1.26)
and solve for the coefficients for the two scenarios separately in the following Lem-
mas.

































where κ∗z is the unique solution to:






Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
Lemma 1.4. For very positive θ¯(τ), positive θ(τ) and very positive κz:







































where κ∗z is the unique solution to:






Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
Once again, prices on the two markets have the same coefficients for the short
rate. Now, local investors’ demand on the two markets are always in the opposite
directions, so the prices on the two markets have different coefficients for λt and zt
even if the funding costs on the two markets have the same sensitivities to λt.
1.4.2 The Expected Excess Returns of Basis Trading and Corporate
Bond
The calculation of expected excess return is complicated by the inclusion of zt, as
the EER of basis trading has exposure to two sources of risk premia now.
Proposition 1.3. Under the two cases described in Lemma 1.3 and Lemma 1.4,









EERpbt = −EERnbt (1.29)










Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
Corollary 1.3. Assume on each market, bonds of all time-to-maturities have the
same funding cost sensitivity to default intensity risk, i.e. αi(τ) = αi. Then, the sign
and size of the expected excess return of basis trading has the following properties:
• EER of basis trading is non-zero unless αc = αd = 0.
• sign(EERnbt) = −sign(EERpbt) = −sign(zct ) The market on which local
investors are selling has higher EER, taking long position on this market and
short position on the other market is expected to earn positive return in excess
of funding costs.
• The size of expected excess return of basis trading is increasing in αi, σj and
|zct |.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
Under the assumption about local investors’ demand in this case, the arbitrageur
is always taking opposite positions on the two markets. If the funding costs are
constants that have no sensitivities to risk factors such as λt, the two assets carry
exactly the same exposure to risk factors. Then the arbitrageur is left with zero
aggregate exposure to any risk factors, therefore all market prices of risk will be
zero. In that case, bonds on both markets and basis trading will all earn zero risk
premia and hence zero EER. But as long as at least one funding cost has sensitivity
to the default intensity risk factor λt, the two assets carry different exposures to
default intensity risk and also different exposures to the demand shock risk. The
arbitrageur captures non-zero aggregate exposures to these two risks, hence market
prices of risks for these two factors are non-zero. Therefore, the two assets carry
different level of risk premium and basis trading is expected to be profitable in ex-
cess of funding costs.
Moreover, the sign of basis trading EER is completely determined by the sign of
local investors’s demand on the cash market. Since the non-zero condition of basis
trading EER is completely determined by the funding costs’ sensitivities to default
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intensity risk, Corollary 3a suggests that the profitability of basis trading is com-
pletely determined by the properties of the two sources of limits to arbitrage. In
the real-world, practitioners tend to see positive CDS basis as signal to do posi-
tive CDS basis trading and vice versa, but results here suggests that the timing
and directional signals of CDS basis trading are current market frictions. The CDS
basis which characterizes price discrepancy between the two markets is an endoge-
nous term itself. Empirical proxies of the interaction of funding cost friction and
demand pressure friction should be more reliable in predicting CDS basis trading
excess returns than the CDS basis.
Corollary 1.4. Assume that the funding costs sensitivities to default intensity risk
are less than L, i.e. 0 < αi < L, i = c, d, then the expected excess return of bond is
positive no matter if local investors are buying or selling.
• When zct < 0: EERc > EERd > 0
• When zct > 0: EERd > EERc > 0
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
The result that if zit > 0 then sign(EER
i) = sign(zit) implies that the arbitrageur is
providing liquidity at a loss, which is against conventional wisdom. The usual con-
clusion on the pricing implication of demand shocks is: when there’s excess demand,
those who provide the liquidity will only agree to sell at a high price in equilibrium
so as to earn something extra, which is the compensation for providing liquidity.
Therefore, the instantaneous expected excess return should have the opposite sign
of the local investors demand. However, in the presence of the other market, the
arbitrageur in this model is willing to provide liquidity at a loss on the market she
shorts because she can earn more on the other market. By doing so, the arbitrageur
doesn’t correct but instead magnifies the price deviation and creates a bubble.
1.4.3 Implications on Basis
Definition 1.3. Basis is the difference between the yield to maturity of bond on
market D minus the yield to maturity of bond on market C with the same time to
maturity.































Under conventional wisdom, negative Basis implies doing negative basis trading is
profitable while positive Basis implies doing positive basis trading is profitable. But
according to the model, the value of Basis is not very meaningful in the presence
of funding costs, as it is only an observed endogenous quantity. As shown in the
previous subsection, the sign of basis trading EER is solely determined by the sign
of local investors’ demand. Deriving the value of Basis is very complicated, as it
depends on the values of λt, zt, τ and the solution of C
i(τ). However, the sensitivities
of Basis to the risk factors can be derived clearly:
Proposition 1.4. The sensitivities of Basis to risk factors are:
• When zct < 0: ∂Basis∂λt < 0, and ∂Basis∂zt > 0.
• When zct > 0: ∂Basis∂λt > 0, and ∂Basis∂zt > 0.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
For zct < 0, which corresponds to the case when local investors are selling, corporate
bond are more sensitive to default intensity risk than CDS. Therefore, increase of
default intensity increases credit spread more than it increases CDS price, thus
causing basis, which is CDS price minus credit spread, to decrease, vice versa. The
result for the comparative statics for zct follows the same logic.
1.4.4 Implications on Term Structure
The coefficients for λt and zt in the bond prices are increasing in the bond’s time to
maturity τ . Assume the funding cost’s sensitivity to λt is the same across τ , then
basis trading on bonds with longer time to maturity has larger net exposure to the
risk factors than basis trading on bonds with shorter time to maturity. Therefore,
the size of basis trading EER is increasing in τ . Together with the properties in
Corollary 1.3 regarding the sign of basis trading EER, I derive the following results:
Proposition 1.5. Assume αc(τ) = αc and αd(τ) = αd for τ ∈ (0, T ], then the term
structures of basis trading expected excess returns are:
• When zct < 0: ∂EER
nbt
∂τ > 0, and
∂EERpbt
∂τ < 0. When local investors are selling
corporate bonds, negative basis trading using longer maturity bonds have higher
EER, while positive basis trading using shorter maturity bonds have higher
EER.
• When zct > 0: ∂EER
nbt
∂τ < 0, and
∂EERpbt
∂τ > 0. When local investors are
buying corporate bonds, negative basis trading using shorter maturity bonds
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have higher EER, while positive basis trading using longer maturity bonds have
higher EER.
• The absolute value of basis trading EER, |EERnbt| or |EERpbt|, is increasing
in the time to maturity of basis trading instruments.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
As in the previous case, Yt(τ) denotes the time t yield to maturity of a corporate
bond with time to maturity τ . The collection of Yt(τ) gives the yield curve of
corporate bonds. As shown below, the slope of corporate bond yield curve ∂Yt(τ)/∂τ
is decreasing in λt, but the degree of the decreasing relationship depends on local
investors’ demand.
Proposition 1.6. Assume 0 < αi(τ) < L, i = c, d, then the sensitivity of yield






]′ < 0 (1.32)
.
• The slope of corporate bond yield curve is decreasing in λt.
• The decreasing effect is stronger when zct < 0 than when zct > 0.
Proof. see Appendix 1.B.
The result that the slope of corporate bond yield curve is decreasing in λt is not
surprising as λt is mean-reverting. But the level of the yield curve is higher in
the case of zct < 0, which corresponds to local investors selling, than in the case
of zct > 0, which corresponds to local investors buying. So the decreasing effect is
stronger when zct < 0.
1.5 Empirical Study
I focus on data between 2007 and 2009, a period which has not only persistently
negative CDS basis, but also high funding costs and poor market liquidity. After
describing the data and key variables, I run a set of regressions to show that the
co-existence of frictions in funding cost and market liquidity turns basis trading
into a risky arbitrage. Then, I show that the comparative statics results of the size
and risk of realized excess returns of basis trading as consistent with the model.
Moreover, I test the predictability of credit spread term structure on future credit
spread changes to support the predictions made in earlier sections.
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1.5.1 Data and Key Variables
I collect a number of CDS and corporate bond indices data from Markit, indi-
vidual CDS data from Bloomberg and corporate bond data from TRACE. I also
download several kinds of interest rates data from the Federal Reserve web-site and
Fama-French three factor data from Kenneth French’s web-site. For the majority
of the data collected, daily observation starts as early as 01/01/2007 and ends at
31/12/2009.
A number of theoretical results to be tested concerns the expected excess return
of basis trading. I use the realized excess return (hereafter RER) of basis trading
between time t and t+k to proxy the expected excess return. Since my main results
are on the instantaneous expected excess returns, I mainly focus on k =1 day and 1
week. The CDS basis was persistently negative for a large part of my sample period,
which saw many practitioners engaged in negative basis trading. So I focus mainly
on the RER of negative basis trading. The realized excess return of doing negative
basis trading between time t and t + k is calculated as the return from holding
a corporate bond index minus the return from holding a CDS index, and minus
net funding costs. To be specific, I calculate the realized excess returns (RERs) of
negative basis trading as:
RERnbtt,t+k = Return
CBond
t,t+k −ReturnCDSt,t+k −NetFundingCostt,t+k (1.33)
where ReturnCBondt,t+k is the realized return of a value-weighted corporate bond index
between time t and t + k. I first collect the 1-10yrs Markit iBoxx USD Domestic
Corporates AAA, AA, A and BBB indices13, and then create the value-weighted
corporate bond index using these 4 indices. Realized return of the corporate bond
index is calculated as the change of the corporate bond index value between time t
and t + k divided by the index value at time t. ReturnCDSt,t+k is the realized return
of the Markit CDX North America Investment Grade Excess Return Index, whose
components have maturities of 5 years.
In the above calculation, NetFundingCostt,t+k is the funding cost of corporate
bond minus the funding cost of writing CDS.14 The funding costs are difficult to
13average maturity around 5-year
14The net funding cost is thus equivalent to the funding cost of buying corporate bond plus the
funding cost of buying CDS protection. But as explained in the next paragraph, the funding cost
of buying CDS protection is effectively negative, since it’s bear by the writer.
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This assumption implies investors can fund the 1− haircut fraction of their corpo-
rate bond purchase at the collateralized rate (TBill), and the haircut fraction at the
un-collateralized rate (LIBOR). The funding cost is increasing in the hair-cut and
the difference between collateralized and un-collateralized rate. This approximation
for the funding cost of corporate bond is consistent with the model’s assumption
on the functional form of the funding costs. Motivation of this approximation can
be found in Appendix 1.A. Ideally, the hair-cut input should be time-varying as
well. However, daily data on hair-cut is very difficult to get. Therefore, I applied
different values of hair-cut for different sub-periods in the sample based on the aver-
age hair-cut data described in Gorton and Metrick (2010). The empirical evidence
is not very sensitive to different hair-cut assumptions. I calculate funding cost for
each day and sum up to get the funding cost between time t and t+ k.
The funding cost of CDS is approximated by the average CDS premium on financial
institutions. During the crisis, the main friction on CDS market is the counterparty
risk, especially from the protection writers’ side. A protection buyer would suffer
from the joint default of the underlying entity and the protection writer. In order
for the protection buyer to be willing to trade at the CDS premium without coun-
terparty risk, the protection buyer requires the protection seller to buy a CDS on
the seller herself for the buyer, so that in the event of joint default, the protection
buyer can at least get paid from the CDS on the protection seller. Therefore, I
calculate the average CDS premium on financial institutions using individual name
CDS data from Bloomberg, and then adjust for the length of period k. As expected,
the funding cost of CDS is close to zero before the crisis, but becomes very large
during the crisis. After the Lehman collapse, the funding cost of CDS is even higher
than the funding cost of corporate bond. This point is consistent with both empir-
ical evidence found by others and observation made by practitioners.
Depending on market conditions, the realized return of negative basis trading can
be positive or negative. The absolute value of the RERnbt measures the size of ba-
sis trading RERs, whose comparative statics properties are tested in the following
sections. To test the term structure property of the size of basis trading RERs, I
further calculated the RERs of negative basis trading on underlying with approxi-
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mately 2 years, 5 years and 9 years using individual CDS and corporate bond data.
I also collect Markit iBoxx USD Domestic Corporate Rating Indices for 1-3 years,
3-5 years, 1-5 years, 5-7 years, 7-10 years and 5-10 years of maturities and use the
asset swap spread of these indices to approximate the credit spread of these matu-
rities and build the credit spread term structure.
Important parameters and variables in the model, such as α, the funding cost’s
sensitivity to default intensity risk, zi, the local investors’ demand, and σλ, the
volatility of default intensity risk are proxied in the following way: In the calcu-
lation of corporate bond’s funding cost, haircut is multiplied by LIBOR − Tbill.
Comparing with the model assumption on the functional form of funding costs, if
hair-cut is linear in default intensity risk λt, then α is a multiple of LIBOR−Tbill,
which is the TED spread. Therefore, α in the model is empirically proxied by the
TED spread (hereafter TED), which is collected from Federal Reserve’s web-site.
As for zi, the sign of local investors’ demand is difficult to measure, but the absolute
value of local investors’ demand on the cash market can be proxied by the corpo-
rate bond market trading volume, hereafter TV , which is collected from TRACE.
I also use the contemporaneous15 volatility of asset swap spread (hereafter ASW )
of Liquid Corporate Bond Index from Markit to proxy for σλ since this particular
asset swap rate is less affected by movements in interest rate and market liquidity.
Other empirical proxies are introduced in the following sections when they emerge.
1.5.2 Rolling Window Time-series Tests on the Realized Excess Returns
of Negative Basis Trading
Hypothesis 1.1. Basis trading returns in excess of arbitrage costs contain time-
varying exposures to systematic risk factors.
The model implies that the expected excess return of basis trading contains com-
pensation for the exposure to risk factors. Therefore, the realized excess return (or
return) of basis trading might be explained by systematic risk factors. However,
the model suggests that negative basis trading’s exposures to risk factors are time-
varying. Depending on the sign of local investors demand and relative sensitivity of
funding cost to λt, negative basis trading can have positive or negative loadings on
the risk premia. In other words, in a time series regression of basis trading RER on
risk factor returns, the betas will be time-varying. Thus it is not appropriate to test
the negative basis trading RERs on systematic factors over the entire sample period.
1590-day period around day t
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Instead, for each month starting from March 2007, I run times-series regressions
on daily observations for the next quarter. For each type of regressions specified
later, I do 30 regressions and obtain 30 sets of coefficient estimates and Newey-West
t-stats. I report these estimates and t-stats in Table 1.1 to Table 1.3 to see the
time-varying patterns of negative basis trading RER’s exposures to risk factors. I
also plot the coefficient estimates for certain factors to highlight the time-varying
patterns that are consistent with the model’s predictions. If basis trading RER rep-
resents compensation for taking systematic risk, then the regression results will have
significant coefficient estimates for the systematic risk factors. I run the following
two regressions to test the above Hypothesis 1.1:
Regression A
RERnbtt,t+k = β0 + β1(LIBOR− FFR)t,t+k + β2FFRt,t+k + β3TEDt,t+k
+β4(TED ∗ASW )t,t+k + β5Basist + A,t (1.35)
Regression B
RERnbtt,t+k = β0 + β1(LIBOR− FFR)t,t+k + β2FFRt,t+k + β3TEDt,t+k
+β4(TED ∗ASW )t,t+k + β5Basist + β6MKTRFt,t+k + β7DEFt,t+k
+β8TERMt,t+k + B,t (1.36)
Because the funding costs in the calculation of basis trading RER may not be accu-
rate enough, I include 4 additional variables to control for potential mis-measurement
of funding costs in Regression A to see if funding costs can explain the RER of
negative basis trading. The four control variables are Libor − FFR, FFR, TED
and TED ∗ASW . FFR is the federal funds rate. The TED ∗ASW term accounts
for the effect from the mis-measurement of the hair-cut. I also include Basis as an
independent variable. Basis is calculated as the average CDS basis16 of a number of
individual entities. Conventional thinking regards negative basis as signal for profit
in doing negative basis trading. But the model doesn’t suggest any relationship be-
tween the level of basis and basis trading returns. Therefore, I include this variable
to test whether there’s any significance relationship.
In Regression B, I add three of the Fama-French five factors. The MKTRF
factor is the excecss return of the market portfolio, the DEF factor is the liquid
16CDS premium minus corporate bond credit spread
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corporate bond index return minus the T-Note index return of similar maturity17,
and the TERM factor is the T-Note return minus the T-Bill return from Kenneth
French’s web-site.18 I use factor values that are contemporaneous to the dependent
variable.
As can be seen from Table 1.1, for Regression A, the funding cost variables are
significant during months 13-20, which correspond to the period from Bear Stearn’s
crisis to the end of 2008. This suggests there may be some mis-measurement in the
funding costs when calculating realized returns, but also suggests funding costs have
important roles in justifying the return of basis trading during the crisis. The Basis
factor is not significant for 27 out of 30 rolling windows. This is consistent with the
model. It highlights the importance of not relying on observed price discrepancy
when doing risky arbitrage because the signal given by price discrepancy is in fact an
endogenous quantity affected by the existence of arbitrage cost such as funding costs.
However, funding costs variables alone are not good enough to explain the return of
negative basis trading. Regression A has significant intercept estimates in most
windows. Adding Fama-French factors doesn’t reduce the significance of intercepts
by much, but the Fama-French factors are indeed significant and the betas are in-
deed time-varying as predicted by the model. As shown in Table 1.2 and Figure
1.2, the beta estimate for the DEF factor is significantly negative for the early
periods but not very significant in latter periods, while the beta estimate for the
TERM factor is not very significant for the early periods but is significantly positive
in latter periods. These patterns in the betas are consistent with model prediction
and empirical results from other papers. According to the model, when corporate
bond market investors are selling, corporate bond returns are more sensitive to risk
factors than CDS, therefore negative basis trading return’s exposures to risk factors
should have the same signs as corporate bond return’s exposures to risk factors.
Meanwhile, Kim et.al.(2010) show that corporate bond returns during the same pe-
riod has negative exposure to the DEF factor and positive exposure to the TERM
factor.
Hypothesis 1.2. Interaction of funding liquidity and market liquidity predicts ab-
normal basis trading return.
According to the model, the expected excess profit of basis trading is driven by the
interaction of funding costs and local investors’ demand. Therefore, I add two other
17calculated based on Markit iBoxx 1-10yrs USD Domestic Treasury Index
18Other Fama-French factors have been tested and removed due to their insignificance.
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terms in Regression C in order to better explain the abnormal returns of basis
trading. The first term SignedTV is the time t corporate bond market trading vol-
ume times the sign of corporate bond index values’ change from t−1 to t. This term
accounts for the momentum driven by market liquidity. The second term is TED
spread squared times adjusted trading volume, where the adjusted trading volume
is calculated as the corporate bond market trading volume minus its -45 days to +45
days median. This adjusted trading volume term is aimed to model the absolute
value of demand shocks in local investors demand, i.e. |zt|. This TED2t ∗ AdjTVt
term is implied by the formula for negative basis trading return in the model.
Regression C
RERnbtt,t+k = β0 + β1(LIBOR− FFR)t,t+k + β2FFRt,t+k + β3TEDt,t+k
+β4(TED ∗ASW )t,t+k + β5Basist + β6MKTRFt,t+k + β7DEFt,t+k
+β8TERMt,t+k + β9SignedTVt + β10TED
2
t ∗AdjTVt + C,t (1.37)
As shown in Table 1.3, the coefficient estimates for the SignedTV term are signif-
icantly positive for most windows. This is not surprising as negative basis trading
consists of buying corporate bond, which is positively affected by the momentum in
corporate bond returns. The coefficient estimates for the TED2t ∗AdjTVt term are
significantly negative during the latter half of 2008. This is highly consistent with
the model’s prediction. Proposition 1.3 suggests that negative basis trading re-
turn is increasing in α and −zt, which during the latter half of 2008 are well proxied
by TED spread and the adjusted corporate bond trading volume respectively. More
importantly, Regression C results in insignificant intercepts for most windows,
and the Basis factor is once again not significant for almost all windows.
To summarize, both Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.2 are supported by the
data. Basis trading RERs contain time-varying exposures to systematic risk factors
and the interaction of funding liquidity and market liquidity has predictive power
on abnormal basis trading returns.
1.5.3 Term Structure of the Size of the Realized Excess Returns of
Negative Basis Trading
Proposition 1.5 predicts that the size of basis trading RER is increasing in the time
to maturity of the underlying bond. I compared the absolute value of basis trading
excess return on underlyings with 2 years, 5 years and 9 years time to maturity. I
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list the average 1-day, 1-week and 1-month absolute RERs for these maturities in
Table 1.4, which shows clearly that basis trading on longer maturities have larger
absolute RERs.
This result is also shown by the plot of cumulative 1-week absolute RER of ba-
sis trading on these maturities in Figure 1.3. Basis trading on longer maturities
have higher cumulative absolute RERs, and the gaps between the lines are also
increasing over time, which is consistent with the prediction that the size of basis
trading RER is increasing in the time to maturity of the underlying bond.
1.5.4 Tests of Comparative Statics
The model yields several testable comparative statics results. The purpose here is to
show that more severe market frictions make basis trading more risky, hence earning
higher expected excess return. To be specific, I tested the following predictions:
Hypothesis 1.3.
• The size of basis trading RER is increasing in αc and σλ.
• Basis trading is risky, the size of basis trading RER is increasing in the volatil-
ity of basis trading RER.
• The volatility of basis trading RER is increasing in αc, which is proxied by
TED spread.
The volatility of basis trading RER is the next 90-day volatility of the negative basis
trading RER. To test the comparative statics results, I sort the time-series of the
absolute value and volatility of basis trading RERs based on their corresponding
TED and default intensity volatility values. For instance, I assign each date in the
sample period into 5 groups according to the TED spread value of each date, the
first group contains dates with the lowest TED spread values, the 5th group contains
dates with the highest TED spread values. Then I calculate the median value of
the absolute value of negative basis trading RER for each group, and report in a
table to see if the group with higher TED spread also has larger basis trading RER
size. I also sort the sizes of basis trading RER into negative basis trading volatility
groups. Results are summarized in Table 1.5, in which each panel provides result
of each comparative statics. In general, the results support Hypothesis 1.3 very
well.
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1.5.5 The Predictability of Credit Spread Term Structure Slope on Fu-
ture Credit Spread Changes
Hypothesis 1.4.
• Credit spread term structure slope positively predicts future credit spread changes
when frictions are small.
• Credit spread term structure slope does not positively predict (and may nega-
tively predict) future credit spread changes when investors are selling corporate
bonds and funding cost has high sensitivity to default intensity risk. This sce-
nario is more likely for shorter maturities.
I carry out the following type of regression to test this hypothesis which corresponds
to Proposition 1.2:
CSt+k − CSt = ψ0 + ψSlopet + t (1.38)
I use 4 sets of dependent variables and independent variables. For instance, for Set
1, I use the 1-5 years grade A corporate bond index asset swap spread as the CS
variable. For this dependent variable, I use the 3-5 years grade A corporate bond
index asset swap spread minus the 1-3 years grade A corporate bond index asset
swap spread as the Slope variable. For this set, the dependent variable proxies the
future change in credit spread of a 3-year corporate bond, while the independent
variable proxies the difference in credit spreads of a 4 year corporate bond and a 2
year corporate bond issued by the same entity as the 3-year bond. The independent
variable thus proxies the term structure of credit spread at 3 years. A full list of
variables for other sets are listed in Table 1.6, which also reports regression results.
I test for k =5 days and 15 days respectively and run the regressions on three sub-
periods: Sub-period 1 (07/2007 to 02/2008), Sub-period 2 (03/2008-03/2009) and
Sub-period 3 (04/2009-09/2009) to account for different levels of market frictions.
The results support Hypothesis 1.4. For Sub-period 1 (07/2007 to 02/2008) and
Sub-period 3 (04/2009-09/2009) that correspond to periods with low market fric-
tions, the positive predictability of the independent variable on dependent variable
is found in most cases. These results are consistent with Bedendo et.al.(2007). But
in Sub-period 2 (03/2008-03/2009) when market frictions are high after the Bear
Stern and Lehman Collapse, the predictability is lost for Set 1 and Set 3, which
correspond to credit spread term structure at approximately 3 years, while the pre-
dictability is still significant for Set 2 and Set 4, which correspond to longer time
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to maturity at approximately 7.5 years. Such findings support the predictions from
Proposition 1.2, which states that the regression coefficient ψ may not be positive
when friction is high, especially for short maturities. Therefore, it’s not surprising to
find that the predictability is lost during Sub-period 2 for Set 1 and 3. Using shorter
sub-period windows, I find negative coefficient ψ for the 3-year term structure as
shown in Figure 1.4.
1.5.6 Robustness Checks
The main results are not affected when using alternative funding cost proxies. To
test if the results are sensitive to the construction of the Markit indices, I also
construct alternative negative basis trading RERs using individual CDS and corpo-
rate bond data. Regression results using these returns as dependent variables are
consistent with results in the previous section. But individual CDS and corporate
bond data are less reliable than the Markit indices, so I still report results using the
Markit indices as the main results.
1.6 Conclusion
The paper tackles with the puzzle between CDS and corporate bond. Previous lit-
eratures show that buying CDS protection and buying corporate bond should earn
risk free return and CDS-basis, which is CDS price minus credit spread, should be
zero. However, the CDS basis was persistently non-zero during the 2007/2008 finan-
cial crisis, yet many arbitrageurs lost money trying to take advantage of this. The
limited arbitrage literature suggests that no-arbitrage relationship can be violated
when arbitrageurs face risk and costs to do the arbitrage. So it may be intuitive to
think that market frictions such as funding costs cause CDS basis to be non-zero.
But the CDS basis doesn’t signal which market to long and which market to short
so as to earn positive expected returns when there’s funding costs. I use a limited
arbitrage model to analyze the risky arbitrage nature of CDS-basis trading and de-
rive the following three major results:
The first result tells us when CDS-basis trading is expected to earn positive re-
turn when arbitrageurs face funding costs that are increasing in default intensity of
the bonds. To be more specific, there are two cases. In the first case, when local
investors are trading towards the same directions on the two markets, one can earn
positive expected excess return by taking long position on the market whose funding
cost is more sensitive to default intensity; in the second case, when local investors
42
are trading towards different directions on the two markets, one can earn positive
expected excess return by taking long position on the market that local investors
are selling. The rationale is: the presence of demand pressure results in arbitrageurs
requiring risk premium for the positions they take. Without other frictions, demand
pressure alone doesn’t generate pricing discrepancies between assets with identical
cash-flows. But since funding costs also contain systematic risk factor, the two
assets have different loadings on systematic risk factors if they obtain different ex-
posures to the risk factor through funding costs. Therefore, CDS-basis trading has
non-zero loadings on systematic risk factors and is expected to earn non-zero excess
return. As shown in the model, without any one of these two sources of frictions,
the arbitrage only generates zero expected excess return. It may be intuitive to
think that assets with identical cash-flows will have different expected returns when
there’s funding costs involved, but my model shows they can have different expected
returns even after the deduction of funding costs, if funding costs are time-varying
and correlated with assets’ fundamental risk.
Secondly, the paper offers new properties of the term structure of credit spreads.
Previous literatures found that the slope of credit spread term structure positively
predicts future credit spread changes, but when market frictions are high, for in-
stance, funding costs are very sensitive to default intensity and demand pressures
are high, this positive predictability may turn negative. Empirically, I find positive
predictability in periods other than the latter half of 2008 but negative predictability
during the latter half of 2008 for short time-to-maturity bonds, which is consistent
with model prediction.
Moreover, the model also offers closed form solution for defaultable bonds under
market frictions. Defaultable bonds prices are solved as exponential affine functions
of risk factors. As implied by the closed form solution of the expected excess return
of CDS basis trading, an interaction term of funding liquidity and market liquidity
predicts abnormal CDS-basis trading return, especially in the latter half of 2008.
As predicted by the model, empirical risk exposures of CDS-basis trading have strong
time-varying patterns depending on market frictions. I therefore use rolling-window
time-series regressions that are very useful considering the time-varying nature of
betas. I show that basis trading is exposed to systematic risk factors, while the
interaction of funding cost and market liquidity have predictive power on abnormal
basis trading returns. In the cross-section, bonds with longer time-to-maturity re-
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alize larger yet more risky basis trading excess returns. In the time-series, periods
with higher market friction realize larger yet more risky basis trading excess returns.
44
1.7 References
1.1. Bai, Jennie, and Pierre Collin-Dufresne, The Determinants of the CDS-Bond
Basis During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, 2010, Working Paper, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York and Columbia.
1.2. Bedendo, Mascia, Lara Cathcart, and Lina El-Jahel, 2007, The Shape of the
Term Structure of Credit Spreads: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of
Financial Research, Vol. 30, No. 2.
1.3. Berndt, Antje, Rohan Douglas, Darrell Duffie, Mark Ferguson, and David
Schranz, 2009, Measuring default risk premia from default swap rates and
EDFs, Working paper, BIS.
1.4. Bongaerts, Dion, Frank De Jong, and Joost Driessen, 2008, Liquidity and
liquidity risk premia in the CDS market, Working Paper, University of Ams-
terdam.
1.5. Blanco, Roberto, Simon Brennan, and Ian W. Marsh, 2005, An empirical anal-
ysis of the dynamic relationship between investment grade bonds and credit
default swaps, Journal of Finance 60, 2255-2281.
1.6. Buhler, Wolfgang and Monika Trapp, 2009, Time-Varying Credit Risk and
Liquidity Premia in Bond and CDS Markets, Working Paper, University of
Cologne.
1.7. Chen, Long, David A. Lesmond, and Jason Wei, 2007, Corporate yield spreads
and bond liquidity, Journal of Finance 62, 119-149.
1.8. Choudhry, Moorad, 2006, Revisiting the Credit Default Swap Basis: Further
Analysis of the Cash and Synthetic Credit Market Differential, Journal of
Structured Finance, Winter 2006, 21-32.
1.9. Collin-Dufresne, Pierre, Robert S. Goldstein, and J. Spencer Martin, 2001, The
determinants of credit spread changes, Journal of Finance 56, 2177C2207.
1.10. Das Sanjiv R. and Paul Hanouna, 2009, Hedging credit: Equity liquidity mat-
ters, Journal of Financial Intermediation 18, 112C123.
1.11. Driessen, J. 2005, Is Default Event Risk Priced in Corporate Bonds? Review
of Financial Studies 18, 165C195.
1.12. Duffie, Darrell, 1999, Credit swap valuation, Financial Analysts Journal, Jan-
uary/February, 73-87.
45
1.13. Duffie, Darrell, 2005, Credit Risk Modeling with Affine Processes, Cattedra
Galileana Lectures, Journal of Banking and Finance, Volume 29: 2751-2802.
1.14. Duffie, Darrell, and Kenneth J. Singleton, 1999, Modeling term structures of
defaultable bonds, Review of Financial Studies 12, 687C720.
1.15. Ellul, Andrew, Chotibnak Jotikasthira, and Christian T. Lundblad, 2009, Reg-
ulatory Pressure and Fire Sales in the Corporate Bond Markets, Journal of
Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
1.16. Elton, Edwin J., Martin K. Gruber, Deepak Agrawal, and Christopher Mann,
2001, Explaining the rate spread on corporate bonds, The Journal of Finance
56, 247C277.
1.17. Ericsson, Jan, and Olivier Renault, 2006, Liquidity and credit risk, Journal of
Finance 61, 2219-2250.
1.18. Fontana, Alessandro, 2010, The persistent negative CDS-bond basis during
the 2007/08 Financial crisis, Working paper, University of Ca’ Foscari Venice.
1.19. Gabaix, Xavier, 2008, Linearity-Generating Processes: A Modeling Tool Yield-
ing Closed Forms for Asset Prices, Working paper, NYU Stern.
1.20. Garleanu, Nicolae, Lasse Heje Pedersen, and Allen M. Poteshman, 2009, Demand-
Based Option Pricing, Review of Financial Studies, 22 (10): 4259-4299.
1.21. Garleanu, Nicolae and Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2011, Margin-based Asset Pricing
and Deviation from the Law of One Price, 2009, Review of Financial Studes,
vol. 24 (2011), no. 6, pp. 1980-2022.
1.22. Giglio, Stefano, 2011, Credit Default Swap Spreads and Systemic Financial
Risk, Working paper, Havard.
1.23. Gorton, Gary and Andrew Metrick, 2010, Securitized Banking and the Run
on Repo, Working paper, Yale.
1.24. Greenwood, Robin and Dimitri Vayanos, 2010, Bond Supply and Excess Bond
Returns, Working paper, Havard and LSE.
1.25. Gromb, Denis and Dimitri Vayanos, 2010, Limits of Arbitrage: The State of
the Theory, Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2010, 2, 251-275.
46
1.26. Han, Song, and Hao Zhou, 2007, Effects of Bond Liquidity on the Non-default
Component of Corporate Bond Spreads: Evidence from Intraday Transactions
Data, Working paper, Federal Reserve Board.
1.27. Houweling, Patrick, and Ton Vorst, 2005, Pricing default swaps: Empirical
evidence, Journal of International Money and Finance, 24, 1200-1225.
1.28. Houweling, Patrick, Albert Mentink, and Ton Vorst, 2005, Comparing possi-
ble proxies of corporate bond liquidity, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29,
1331C1358.
1.29. Huang, Jing-zhi, and Ming Huang, 2003, How much of the corporate-Treasury
yield spread is due to credit risk? Working paper, Penn State University.
1.30. Hull, John, Mirela Predescu, and Alan White, 2004, The relationship between
credit default swap spreads, bond yields, and credit rating announcements,
Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 2789-2811.
1.31. Jarrow, Robert, 2004, Risky Coupon Bonds as a Portfolio of Zero-Coupon
Bonds, Finance Research Letters 1 (2004) 100C105.
1.32. Jarrow, Robert, David Lando, and Fan YU, 2005, Default Risk and Diver-
sification: Theory and Empirical Implications, Mathematical Finance 15(1),
1-26.
1.33. Jeanblanc, Monique, and Stoyan Valchev, 2007, Default-risky bond prices
with jumps, liquidity risk and incomplete information. Decisions Econ Fi-
nan (2007) 30:109C136.
1.34. Jurek, Jakub W. and Erik Stafford, 2011, Crashes and Collateralized Lending,
Working paper, Princeton and Harvard.
1.35. Kim, Gi Hyun, Haitao Li, and Weina Zhang, 2010, The CDS/Bond Basis and
the Cross Section of Corporate Bond Returns, Working paper, University of
Michigan and NUS.
1.36. Longstaff, Francis A., Sanjay Mithal, and Eric Neis, 2005, Corporate yield
spreads: Default risk or liquidity? New evidence from credit-default swap
market, Journal of Finance 60, 2213-2253.
1.37. Mitchell, Mark, and Todd Pulvino, 2011, Arbitrage Crashes and the Speed of
Capital, Journal of Financial Economics, Forthcoming.
47
1.38. Naranjo, Lorenzo, 2009, Implied Interest Rates in a Market with Frictions,
Working Paper, ESSEC.
1.39. Nashikkar, Amrut, and Marti Subrahmanyam, 2006, Latent liquidity and cor-
porate bond yield spreads, Working paper, NYU Stern.
1.40. Pan, Jun, and Kenneth J. Singleton, 2005, Default and recovery implicit in the
term structure of sovereign CDS spreads, Working paper, MIT and Stanford.
1.41. Tang, Dragon-Yongjun. and Hong Yan, 2007, Liquidity and Credit Default
Swap Spreads, Working Paper, University of South Carolina and Kennesaw
State University.
1.42. Tuckman Bruce and Jean-Luc Vila, 1992, Arbitrage with Funding Costs: a
Utility-based Approach. Journal of Finance 47:1283-1302.
1.43. Vayanos, Dimitri and Jean-Luc Vila, 2009, A Preferred-Habitat Model of the
Term Structure of Interest Rates, Working Paper, LSE and Merrill Lynch.
1.44. Vayanos, Dimitri and Jiang Wang, 2009, Liquidity and Asset Prices: A Unified
Framework, Working paper, LSE and MIT.
1.45. Yu, Fan, 2003, Dependent Default in Intensity-Based Models, Working Paper,
Claremont Mckenna College.
1.46. Zhu, Haibin, 2006, An Empirical Comparison of Credit Spreads between the
Bond Market and the Credit Default Swap Market, Journal of Financial Ser-
vices Research 29, 211-235.
48
1.8 Appendix 1.A: Motivation for the Funding Costs Function
1.A1. Borrowing Costs
When buying the defaultable bonds through borrowing, one can not borrow at the
rate of rt. The total cost is rt + ht, where ht reflects the borrowing cost in excess of
rt. The existence of ht represents a source of market friction. The model assumes
that ht is an increasing linear function of the default intensity risk λt:
hit(τ) = α
i(τ)λt + δ
i(τ) i = c, d 0 < αi < L (1.39)
This is a reasonable assumption with motivation illustrated in the following way:
Consider a simplified version of repo transaction, assume there’s a continuum of
competitive cash lenders who lend out yt amount of cash if the borrowers offer 1-
dollar worth of defautable bond as collateral.19 The borrower may default on the
obligation to pay back, denote N¯t as counting process for the borrower’s default,
assume the intensity of N¯t is f(λt), which is increasing in λt. This is a reasonable
assumption in the real world, the borrowers are usually buyers of the defaultable
bond who can only afford to buy through borrowing, and rely on the selling of the
bond to pay back their borrowing. If the bond defaults, they are unlikely to pay







dwt = (wt − yt)rtdt+ yt(rt + s)dt+ [(1− L)− yt]dN¯t (1.41)
where rt+s, s > 0, is the exogenous rate asked by the lender for lending against the
defaultable bond as collateral.20 The wt−yt part of her wealth increases at the rate
of rt, while the yt part earns interest rate rt+ s. If the borrower defaults, the lender
retains the bond, which is now worth 1 − L but loses the yt lent to the borrower.






+ (1− L) (1.42)
19The lender effectively buys the bond for yt, while the borrower promises to buy back the bond
at a price higher than yt at the end of the repo contract that reflects an interest rate higher than
the short rate rt.
20rt can be understood as the rate asked by the lender for lending against default-free bond as
collateral.
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Therefore, y∗t is decreasing in f(λt), thus decreasing in λt. In other words, the
amount a borrower can borrow using defaultable bond as collateral is decreasing in
the riskiness of the bond. 1− y∗t is the so-called ‘hair-cut’asked by the lender. The
hair-cut is increasing in the riskiness of the bond. The borrower borrows y∗t fraction
of her bond purchase at the rt + s rate charged by the lender, and the rest 1 − y∗t
fraction at an exogenous un-collateralized rate rt + u from somewhere else. Here,
u > s > 0 since un-collateralized borrowing is riskier than collateralized borrowing.
So the borrower’s total borrowing cost in excess of rt is:
ht = y
∗
t (rt + s) + (1− y∗t )(rt + u)− rt = u− (u− s)y∗t (1.43)
which is a decreasing function of y∗t . Since y∗t is decreasing in λt, the borrowing
cost ht is increasing in λt. With careful choice of the exogenous function f(λt), the
borrow cost has the linear functional form of αλt + δ used in the model.
1.A2. Short-selling Costs
When short-selling the defaultable bond, one needs to borrow the bond from a bond
lender. The bond lender asks for cash-collateral of a certain amount. Effectively,
the short-seller buys the bond for that amount while the bond lender agrees to buy
back the bond at the end of the reverse-repo contract for an amount higher than
the initial cash-collateral. However, the end-of-the-day amount usually reflects an
interest rate paid on the cash-collateral that is lower than the short-rate. The short-
seller hence incur short-selling costs.
Assume there’s a continuum of competitive bond lenders that require Yt amount
of cash-collateral for 1-dollar worth of bond lent. The short-seller, i.e. the bond
borrower, may default on the obligation to return the bond, denote N˜t as counting
process for the short-seller’s default, assume the intensity of N˜t is g(λt) which is
decreasing in λt. This is a reasonable assumption in the real world, when λt is low,
the bond price is high, the short-seller is more likely to suffer loss and hence default
on the obligation to return the bond. Denote the wealth of the lender by wt, then






dwt = (wt + Yt)rtdt− Yt(rt − S)dt+ (Yt − 1)dN˜t (1.45)
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where rt − S, S > 0, is the exogenous special repo rate offered by the bond lender
on the cash collateral. The wt + Yt part of her wealth increases at the rate of rt,
while the Yt part pays interest rate rt − S. If the short-seller defaults, the lender








Therefore Y ∗t is decreasing in g(λt), thus increasing in λt. The short-seller puts Y ∗t
fraction of her bond sales as cash-collateral which earns interest at the rate of rt−S
and invests the rest 1− y∗t fraction at the short rate rt. So her short selling cost is:
ht = rt − [Y ∗t (rt − S) + (1− Y ∗t )rt] = SY ∗t (1.47)
which is an increasing function of Y ∗t . Since Y ∗t is also increasing in λt, the short-
selling cost ht is increasing in λt. With careful choice of the exogenous function
g(λt), the short-selling cost has the linear functional form of αλt + δ used in the
model.
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1.9 Appendix 1.B: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
1.B1. Proof of Lemma 1.1
In the most general set-up, there’re 4 sources of uncertainties: the jump at default,
characterized by Nt, and three Brownian Motions in the default intensity risk factor
λt, short rate factor rt and local investors’ demand shock factor zt, i.e. Bλ,t, Br,t
and Bz,t. The dynamic of Nt only enters into play through λt, so I can rewrite P
d
t (τ)
as P dt (τ, λ, r, z) and P
c
t (τ) as P
c
t (τ, λ, r, z). Assuming all three Brownian Motions
Bλ,t, Br,t and Bz,t are independent, I apply Ito’s lemma to write dP
c
t (τ, λ, z) and
dP dt (τ, λ, z) as:

















































and µj = κj(j¯− jt), i = c, d, j = λ, r, z. µct and µdt are the expected returns of bond
C and bond D, conditional on no default. Dropping τ , the E(dWt) and V ar(dWt)
terms in the optimization problem are:









































t (τ)]dτ}2(λ˜+ λt)dt (1.52)
Entering the above terms into the optimization problem,
∂[E(dWt)− γ2 V ar(dWt)]
∂xit
, i =
c, d, gives the F.O.C.s in Lemma 1.1.
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1.B2. Proof of Lemma 1.2










= µctdt−AcλσλdBλ,t −AcrσrdBr,t (1.53)
dP dt
P dt
= µdt dt−AdλσλdBλ,t −AdrσrdBr,t (1.54)
where, omitting τ , the instantaneous expected returns conditional on no default are:





























Substitute the above into the dynamic budget constraint, the arbitrageur’s F.O.C.s
are:
µct(τ)− rt − hct(τ)
|xct(τ)|
xct(τ)
− L(λ˜+ λt) = LΦJ,t − σλAcλ(τ)Φλ,t − σrAcr(τ)Φr,t
(1.57)
µdt (τ)− rt − hdt (τ)
|xdt (τ)|
xdt (τ)
















[−xdt (τ)Adr(τ)− xct(τ)Acr(τ)]dτ (1.61)
are the market prices of risks to the default jump, default intensity and short rate
factors.
In equilibrium, markets clear. So xit + z
i = 0, i = c, d. Replace xit(τ) by −zi(τ),
and replace hit by the functions defined in the funding cost section, then the F.O.C.s
are affine equations in the risk factors λt and rt. Setting the linear terms in λt and
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rt to zeros implies that A
i
j(τ) are the solutions to a system of ODEs with initial
conditions Aij(0) = 0, i = c, d and j = λ, r:
Acλ
′(τ) + κλAcλ(τ)− [−αc(τ)
|zc(τ)|
zc(τ)























r(τ)− 1 = 0 (1.65)
Thus, Aij(τ) are solved as in Lemma 1.2.















∂r with −Acλ(τ), −Adλ(τ), −Acr(τ), −Adr(τ)
respectively in Definition 1.1 gives Proposition 1.1. Because−Acr(τ) and−Adr(τ)
are the same, so the two exposures to the short rate risk cancel out each other, only
the exposure to the default intensity risk premium Φλ,t remains.
1.B4. Proof of Corollary 1.1
Point 1: 1) If αc(τ) = αd(τ) = 0, then EERnbt = EERpnt = 0. 2) If αc(τ) =
αd(τ) 6= 0 and sign[zc(τ)] = sign[zd(τ)], then the term inside the bracket in the
EER formula equals zero, so EERnbt = EERpnt = 0. 3) If zc(τ) = zd(τ) = 0, then
Φλ,t = 0, so EER
nbt = EERpnt = 0.
Point 2: If zc(τ) < 0 and zd(τ) < 0, then Φλ,t < 0, and sign(EER
nbt) = −sign(EERpbt) =
sign(αc(τ) − αd(τ). If αc(τ) > αd(τ), then EERnbt > 0, i.e. buying on market C
and selling on market D earns positive expected excess return; if αd(τ) > αc(τ),
then EERpbt > 0, i.e. buying on market D and selling on market C earns positive
expected excess return.
If zc(τ) > 0 and zd(τ) > 0, but both not too large, then then Φλ,t > 0, and
sign(EERnbt) = −sign(EERpbt) = sign(αc(τ)− αd(τ). The rest follows the above
zc(τ) < 0 and zd(τ) < 0 case.
Point 3: If zc(τ) >> 0 and zd(τ) >> 0, then then Φλ,t < 0, and sign(EER
nbt) =
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−sign(EERpbt) = −sign(αc(τ) − αd(τ). If αc(τ) < αd(τ), then EERnbt > 0, i.e.
buying on market C and selling on market D earns positive expected excess return;
if αd(τ) < αc(τ), then EERpbt > 0, i.e. buying on market D and selling on market
C earns positive expected excess return.
1.B5. Proof of Corollary 1.2
Point 1: If sign(zc) = sign(zd), then the size of basis trading’s exposure to the
default intensity risk is: | ± σλ[αc(τ)−αd(τ)]1−e−κλτκλ |. Because σλ 1−e
−κλτ
κλ
> 0, it is
increasing in |αc − αd|.
Point 2: If sign(zc) = −sign(zd), then the size of basis trading’s exposure to the
default intensity risk is: | ± σλ[αc(τ) +αd(τ)]1−e−κλτκλ |. Because σλ 1−e
−κλτ
κλ
> 0, it is
increasing in αc + αd.
Point 3: Size of basis trading EER is: | ± σλ[αc(τ) |z
c(τ)|







It is equal to σλ|[αc(τ) |z
c(τ)|






|, which is increasing in σλ.
1.B6. Proof of Proposition 1.2
































τAcλ(τ −∆τ)e−κλ∆τ − (τ −∆τ)Acλ(τ)
(τ −∆τ)Acλ(τ)− τAcλ(τ −∆τ)
(1.67)
when ∆τ → 0,





′ − 1] (1.68)
=
F (τ)
1− F (τ)e−κλτ (1.69)
where F (τ) = −αc(τ) |zc(τ)|zc(τ) + L− γL2
∫ T
0 [z
c(τ) + zd(τ)]dτ .
If αc(τ) = 0 and zc(τ) = zd(τ) = 0, then F = L. 0 < F < 1, so ψ = F (τ)
1−F (τ)e−κλτ > 0.
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If zc(τ) << 0, αc(τ) >> 0, then F >> 0. So ψ = F (τ)
1−F (τ)e−κλτ < 0.
When F > 0, the threshold for ψ < 0 is F > eκλτ , which is easier to meet for
small τ than for large τ .
1.B7. Proof of Lemma 1.3 and Lemma 1.4
Apply Ito’s lemma to the conjectured prices, the Arbitrageur’s F.O.C.s are:
µct(τ)− rt − hct(τ)
|xct(τ)|
xct(τ)
− L(λ˜+ λt) = LΦJ,t − σλAcλ(τ)Φλ,t − σrAcr(τ)Φr,t − σzAcz(τ)Φz,t
(1.70)
µdt (τ)− rt − hdt (τ)
|xdt (τ)|
xdt (τ)




















[−xdt (τ)Adz(τ)− xct(τ)Acz(τ)]dτ (1.75)
are the market prices of risks to the default jump, default intensity, short rate and
demand shock factors.
In equilibrium, markets clear. So xit + z
i
t = 0. Replace x
i
t with −zit in the above
F.O.C.s, then the F.O.C.s are affine equations in the risk factors λt, rt and zt.
21
Setting the linear terms in λt, rt and zt to zero implies that A
i
j(τ) are the solutions
to the a system of ODEs with initial conditions Aij(0) = 0, i = c, d and j = λ, r, z.
If θ¯(τ) << 0 and θ(τ) < 0, then zct (τ) < 0, z
d
t (τ) > 0. So x
c
t(τ) > 0 and x
d
t (τ) < 0.
The system of ODEs becomes:
Acλ





λ(τ)− [−αd(τ) + L] = 0 (1.77)
21By assuming that the two markets have exact opposite demand pressure, the market price of









r(τ)− 1 = 0 (1.79)
Acz






















The first 4 equations can be solved independently. The solutions are as summarized
in Lemma 1.3. For the last 2 equations, the solutions are as in Lemma 1.3 because
the equation:






has a unique solution in the region (0,+∞), as κ∗z is increasing from the origin in




z(τ)−Adz(τ)]dτ is positive decreasing in
the region (0,+∞).
If θ¯(τ) >> 0 and θ(τ) > 0, then zct (τ) > 0, z
d
t (τ) < 0. So x
c
t(τ) < 0 and x
d
t (τ) > 0.
The system of ODEs becomes:
Acλ





λ(τ)− [αd(τ) + L] = 0 (1.84)
Acr





r(τ)− 1 = 0 (1.86)
Acz























The first 4 equations can be solved independently. The solutions are as summa-
rized in Lemma 1.4. For the last 2 equations, the solutions are as in Lemma
1.4 if κz >> 0. κ
∗





z(τ)−Adz(τ)]dτ is negative and decreasing in the region (0,+∞). How-






z(τ)−Adz(τ)]dτ is decreasing from a positive
value in the region (0,+∞). Then the equation has unique solution in (0,+∞).





























∂z with −Acλ(τ), −Adλ(τ),
−Acr(τ), −Adr(τ), −Acz(τ) and −Adz(τ) respectively in Definition 1.1 gives Propo-
sition 1.3. Because −Acr(τ) and −Adr(τ) are the same, so the two exposures to the
short rate risk cancel out each other, only the exposure to the default intensity risk
premium Φλ,t and the exposure to the demand shock risk premium Φz,t remain.
1.B9. Proof of Corollary 1.3
Point 1: If αc = αd = 0, then Gλ = 0 and Gz = 0, so EERnbt = 0 and
















so EERnbt 6= 0 and EERpbt 6= 0.
Point 2: Directly derived from Equation (1.90). Point 3: Directly derived from
the first order derivatives of |EERnbt|.
1.B10. Proof of Corollary 4


















When zct < 0, according to Lemma 1.3, A
c
λ(τ) − Adλ(τ) > 0, Aiλ(τ) > 0, Acz(τ) −
Adz(τ) < 0 and A
i
z(τ) < 0. So EER
c > 0 and EERd > 0. According to Corollary
1.3, when zct < 0, EER
nbt = EERc − EERd > 0, therefore, EERc > EERd > 0.
When zct > 0, according to Lemma 1.4, A
c
λ(τ) − Adλ(τ) < 0, Aiλ(τ) > 0, Acz(τ) −
Adz(τ) < 0 and A
i
z(τ) > 0. So EER
c > 0 and EERd > 0. According to Corollary
1.3, when zct > 0, EER
pbt = EERd − EERc > 0, therefore, EERd > EERc > 0.





















Therefore, sign(∂Basis∂λt ) = sign(A
d
λ−Acλ) and sign(∂Basis∂zt ) = sign(Adz −Acz). When





















































Then, the proof is similar to that in the Proof of Corollary 1.3.











when zct < 0 and
Acλ(τ)
τ = [−αc + L]1−e
−κλτ
κλτ
when zct > 0.
1−e−κλτ
κλτ
is a decreasing function of τ . Also
note that 0 < αi(τ) < L, therefore [αc + L](1−e
−κλτ
κλτ




< 0. And it is more negative when zct < 0.
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1.10 Appendix 1.C: Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1: CDS Basis and 1-week Negative Basis Trading RER
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Figure 1.2: Negative Basis Trading RER’s Time-varying Exposure to Systematic
Factors
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative Absolute RERs of Negative Basis
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Figure 1.4: Time-varying Coefficient Estimate of ψ for 3yr Grade A Corporate Bond
Index
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Start End constant Libor‐FFR FFR TED TED*ASW Basis
Mar‐07 May‐07 0.001 0.544 ‐0.064 ‐0.739 0.605 0.506
Apr‐07 Jun‐07 0.040 ‐2.401 ‐2.752 ‐1.596 3.298 0.703
May‐07 Jul‐07 ‐0.049 3.389 3.314 0.110 ‐0.872 0.713
Jun‐07 Aug‐07 ‐0.025 2.370 1.792 0.180 ‐1.170 0.159
Jul‐07 Sep‐07 0.006 0.480 ‐0.315 0.295 ‐0.796 0.099
Aug‐07 Oct‐07 0.005 ‐0.008 ‐0.321 0.049 ‐0.222 0.380
Sep‐07 Nov‐07 0.001 ‐0.057 ‐0.110 0.884 ‐0.698 0.290
Oct‐07 Dec‐07 0.007 ‐0.773 ‐0.527 0.503 ‐0.180 0.044
Nov‐07 Jan‐08 0.001 ‐0.064 0.036 0.367 ‐0.420 0.075
Dec‐07 Feb‐08 ‐0.002 0.572 0.275 0.474 ‐0.378 0.118
Jan‐08 Mar‐08 ‐0.007 2.252 0.917 ‐0.212 ‐0.214 0.217
Feb‐08 Apr‐08 ‐0.008 2.777 1.339 ‐1.726 0.349 0.261
Mar‐08 May‐08 0.011 1.640 ‐2.049 ‐2.549 1.182 ‐0.314
Apr‐08 Jun‐08 ‐0.018 5.203 3.304 ‐8.051 3.159 ‐0.141
May‐08 Jul‐08 ‐0.019 4.961 3.399 ‐4.758 1.362 ‐0.470
Jun‐08 Aug‐08 0.018 0.099 ‐2.994 1.141 ‐0.910 ‐0.275
Jul‐08 Sep‐08 0.010 0.744 ‐0.929 ‐2.635 0.596 0.422
Aug‐08 Oct‐08 0.008 0.275 ‐1.250 ‐1.188 0.331 0.456
Sep‐08 Nov‐08 0.002 ‐0.204 ‐1.322 0.085 0.178 0.334
Oct‐08 Dec‐08 0.001 ‐0.680 ‐1.958 1.878 ‐0.200 0.303
Nov‐08 Jan‐09 ‐0.002 0.906 0.692 0.623 ‐0.280 ‐0.102
Dec‐08 Feb‐09 0.007 1.539 ‐13.012 4.885 ‐1.609 ‐0.069
Jan‐09 Mar‐09 0.004 1.677 ‐7.665 3.424 ‐1.181 ‐0.030
Feb‐09 Apr‐09 0.004 0.679 ‐9.861 0.800 ‐0.180 0.149
Mar‐09 May‐09 0.005 1.720 ‐9.133 0.439 ‐0.275 0.259
Apr‐09 Jun‐09 ‐0.002 ‐0.302 4.188 0.513 0.023 0.155
May‐09 Jul‐09 ‐0.005 3.115 6.883 5.158 ‐2.234 0.220
Jun‐09 Aug‐09 ‐0.008 5.581 18.200 0.867 ‐1.487 0.099
Jul‐09 Sep‐09 0.001 3.351 ‐4.239 3.337 ‐2.016 0.315





Start End constant Libor‐FFR FFR TED TED*ASW Basis
Mar‐07 May‐07 0.022 0.153 ‐0.018 ‐1.338 1.210 1.503
Apr‐07 Jun‐07 0.504 ‐0.501 ‐0.505 ‐1.581 1.750 1.965
May‐07 Jul‐07 ‐1.755 2.169 1.765 0.111 ‐0.684 1.224
Jun‐07 Aug‐07 ‐2.641 3.988 2.655 0.192 ‐1.332 0.385
Jul‐07 Sep‐07 0.550 0.779 ‐0.429 0.302 ‐0.773 0.248
Aug‐07 Oct‐07 0.879 ‐0.012 ‐0.650 0.050 ‐0.247 1.647
Sep‐07 Nov‐07 0.126 ‐0.084 ‐0.132 1.846 ‐1.640 1.367
Oct‐07 Dec‐07 1.616 ‐1.891 ‐1.407 0.985 ‐0.561 0.251
Nov‐07 Jan‐08 0.334 ‐0.127 0.128 0.308 ‐0.501 0.274
Dec‐07 Feb‐08 ‐0.590 0.941 0.763 0.398 ‐0.612 0.392
Jan‐08 Mar‐08 ‐0.993 1.849 0.974 ‐0.082 ‐0.167 0.698
Feb‐08 Apr‐08 ‐0.838 1.833 0.799 ‐0.715 0.359 0.597
Mar‐08 May‐08 0.373 0.454 ‐0.388 ‐0.878 1.870 ‐1.066
Apr‐08 Jun‐08 ‐1.985 3.651 2.078 ‐2.765 2.139 ‐0.515
May‐08 Jul‐08 ‐2.055 3.395 1.991 ‐2.464 1.538 ‐2.239
Jun‐08 Aug‐08 1.370 0.089 ‐1.186 0.758 ‐1.798 ‐1.524
Jul‐08 Sep‐08 2.900 1.581 ‐1.585 ‐2.629 2.225 1.802
Aug‐08 Oct‐08 2.884 0.430 ‐2.405 ‐0.868 1.004 2.506
Sep‐08 Nov‐08 1.298 ‐0.254 ‐2.975 0.059 0.590 1.835
Oct‐08 Dec‐08 0.845 ‐0.671 ‐1.512 1.021 ‐0.507 1.704
Nov‐08 Jan‐09 ‐1.115 0.883 0.337 0.297 ‐0.514 ‐0.575
Dec‐08 Feb‐09 3.081 1.067 ‐3.909 2.042 ‐2.520 ‐0.456
Jan‐09 Mar‐09 1.153 1.635 ‐1.315 1.345 ‐1.682 ‐0.218
Feb‐09 Apr‐09 1.258 0.519 ‐1.319 0.855 ‐1.218 0.892
Mar‐09 May‐09 2.264 1.288 ‐1.807 0.462 ‐1.004 1.675
Apr‐09 Jun‐09 ‐0.695 ‐0.084 0.620 0.232 0.085 0.763
May‐09 Jul‐09 ‐1.641 1.009 0.914 1.370 ‐1.897 0.725
Jun‐09 Aug‐09 ‐1.957 1.735 1.855 0.310 ‐1.699 0.420
Jul‐09 Sep‐09 0.601 1.069 ‐0.722 0.514 ‐0.532 1.200
Aug‐09 Oct‐09 0.976 1.535 ‐0.676 0.973 ‐1.239 0.126
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Start End constant Libor‐FFR FFR TED TED*ASW Basis MKTRF DEF TERM
Mar‐07 May‐07 0.068 ‐3.273 ‐4.633 ‐0.484 0.709 0.270 0.016 ‐0.282 0.020
Apr‐07 Jun‐07 0.021 ‐2.775 ‐1.433 ‐3.512 8.881 0.696 ‐0.030 ‐0.436 0.079
May‐07 Jul‐07 ‐0.057 3.635 3.935 0.505 ‐1.418 0.798 ‐0.029 ‐0.607 0.104
Jun‐07 Aug‐07 ‐0.013 1.515 1.024 ‐0.960 0.273 0.237 ‐0.051 ‐0.745 0.056
Jul‐07 Sep‐07 0.018 0.051 ‐1.145 ‐2.355 2.169 0.376 ‐0.067 ‐1.007 0.040
Aug‐07 Oct‐07 0.002 0.360 ‐0.063 ‐0.565 0.367 0.272 ‐0.032 ‐0.757 0.030
Sep‐07 Nov‐07 ‐0.006 0.110 0.494 0.401 ‐0.276 0.369 ‐0.019 ‐0.466 0.062
Oct‐07 Dec‐07 0.001 ‐0.543 ‐0.055 0.599 ‐0.167 0.027 ‐0.041 ‐0.424 0.132
Nov‐07 Jan‐08 0.000 ‐0.258 0.040 0.448 0.009 ‐0.208 ‐0.059 ‐0.330 0.209
Dec‐07 Feb‐08 0.000 0.646 0.048 0.587 ‐0.413 ‐0.213 ‐0.048 ‐0.603 0.056
Jan‐08 Mar‐08 ‐0.011 2.635 1.402 ‐1.024 0.253 ‐0.034 ‐0.057 ‐0.605 0.060
Feb‐08 Apr‐08 ‐0.013 4.292 2.066 ‐3.766 1.316 0.328 ‐0.103 ‐0.650 0.166
Mar‐08 May‐08 0.010 1.730 ‐1.818 ‐3.473 1.722 ‐0.248 ‐0.142 ‐0.502 0.106
Apr‐08 Jun‐08 ‐0.019 5.671 3.676 ‐9.383 3.915 0.111 ‐0.036 ‐0.413 0.187
May‐08 Jul‐08 ‐0.023 5.239 4.147 ‐5.518 1.835 ‐0.218 ‐0.046 ‐0.413 0.209
Jun‐08 Aug‐08 0.006 1.868 ‐0.575 1.885 ‐1.786 ‐0.679 ‐0.065 ‐0.161 0.319
Jul‐08 Sep‐08 0.008 1.558 ‐0.061 ‐3.650 0.676 0.341 ‐0.041 ‐0.088 0.251
Aug‐08 Oct‐08 0.006 0.479 ‐0.642 ‐1.354 0.338 0.403 ‐0.033 0.110 0.395
Sep‐08 Nov‐08 0.002 0.141 ‐0.666 ‐0.647 0.317 0.368 ‐0.039 0.041 0.410
Oct‐08 Dec‐08 0.001 ‐0.168 ‐1.424 0.875 ‐0.048 0.214 ‐0.042 0.213 1.172
Nov‐08 Jan‐09 0.000 1.597 ‐0.474 1.450 ‐0.518 0.003 ‐0.035 0.106 0.980
Dec‐08 Feb‐09 0.006 0.531 ‐11.117 5.893 ‐1.694 ‐0.009 0.002 0.140 0.691
Jan‐09 Mar‐09 0.002 1.948 ‐4.978 4.822 ‐1.629 ‐0.050 ‐0.010 0.072 0.628
Feb‐09 Apr‐09 0.004 0.151 ‐9.468 0.844 ‐0.139 0.124 0.000 0.079 0.328
Mar‐09 May‐09 0.004 1.066 ‐7.447 0.398 ‐0.141 0.245 ‐0.032 0.009 0.492
Apr‐09 Jun‐09 ‐0.001 ‐4.554 1.482 2.018 0.222 0.229 ‐0.020 ‐0.015 0.941
May‐09 Jul‐09 ‐0.003 ‐2.891 1.308 7.599 ‐2.122 0.175 ‐0.046 ‐0.003 1.195
Jun‐09 Aug‐09 ‐0.006 2.394 11.082 2.999 ‐1.610 ‐0.078 ‐0.029 ‐0.011 1.199
Jul‐09 Sep‐09 0.001 2.117 ‐4.418 11.093 ‐5.735 ‐0.020 0.011 0.042 0.996





Start End constant Libor‐FFR FFR TED TED*ASW Basis MKTRF DEF TERM
Mar‐07 May‐07 1.040 ‐0.878 ‐1.038 ‐0.867 1.006 0.939 0.640 ‐4.756 1.105
Apr‐07 Jun‐07 0.276 ‐0.554 ‐0.276 ‐3.322 4.422 3.065 ‐1.079 ‐6.020 1.787
May‐07 Jul‐07 ‐2.823 3.272 2.884 0.511 ‐1.250 1.658 ‐1.323 ‐3.341 1.856
Jun‐07 Aug‐07 ‐0.790 1.982 0.918 ‐0.945 0.274 0.692 ‐2.478 ‐4.520 0.925
Jul‐07 Sep‐07 1.831 0.105 ‐1.637 ‐2.130 2.075 1.046 ‐3.405 ‐5.428 1.080
Aug‐07 Oct‐07 0.394 0.894 ‐0.143 ‐0.678 0.490 1.019 ‐1.571 ‐7.699 0.686
Sep‐07 Nov‐07 ‐0.466 0.143 0.520 0.510 ‐0.586 1.378 ‐0.980 ‐3.154 0.805
Oct‐07 Dec‐07 0.365 ‐1.281 ‐0.151 0.575 ‐0.258 0.126 ‐2.083 ‐3.228 1.277
Nov‐07 Jan‐08 ‐0.080 ‐0.548 0.154 0.279 0.008 ‐0.849 ‐2.813 ‐4.444 2.364
Dec‐07 Feb‐08 ‐0.029 1.009 0.174 0.471 ‐0.677 ‐0.884 ‐1.798 ‐5.866 0.509
Jan‐08 Mar‐08 ‐1.420 1.870 1.446 ‐0.423 0.220 ‐0.127 ‐1.457 ‐5.918 0.610
Feb‐08 Apr‐08 ‐1.545 2.860 1.471 ‐1.833 1.600 0.883 ‐2.289 ‐5.915 1.490
Mar‐08 May‐08 0.456 0.602 ‐0.467 ‐1.419 2.244 ‐0.827 ‐2.325 ‐5.526 1.342
Apr‐08 Jun‐08 ‐1.835 3.613 1.940 ‐3.137 2.736 0.547 ‐1.647 ‐6.488 1.875
May‐08 Jul‐08 ‐2.048 3.145 2.058 ‐2.823 2.264 ‐1.131 ‐3.010 ‐4.561 1.986
Jun‐08 Aug‐08 0.587 1.928 ‐0.322 1.661 ‐4.954 ‐3.058 ‐4.014 ‐1.619 3.000
Jul‐08 Sep‐08 2.688 2.015 ‐0.095 ‐2.680 2.000 1.220 ‐1.717 ‐0.906 1.595
Aug‐08 Oct‐08 2.557 0.674 ‐1.304 ‐0.933 1.035 2.076 ‐1.658 0.925 1.948
Sep‐08 Nov‐08 1.541 0.181 ‐1.316 ‐0.489 1.167 2.164 ‐1.969 0.294 1.657
Oct‐08 Dec‐08 0.945 ‐0.192 ‐1.444 0.553 ‐0.142 1.399 ‐2.082 1.915 3.010
Nov‐08 Jan‐09 ‐0.519 1.748 ‐0.331 0.748 ‐1.031 0.016 ‐1.575 1.076 3.834
Dec‐08 Feb‐09 3.582 0.325 ‐4.750 3.427 ‐2.968 ‐0.063 0.158 1.622 4.773
Jan‐09 Mar‐09 0.814 1.660 ‐0.868 2.556 ‐3.002 ‐0.318 ‐0.620 0.802 4.131
Feb‐09 Apr‐09 1.328 0.094 ‐1.369 0.844 ‐0.864 0.736 ‐0.002 0.979 1.576
Mar‐09 May‐09 1.575 0.749 ‐1.374 0.424 ‐0.505 1.801 ‐1.401 0.201 1.909
Apr‐09 Jun‐09 ‐0.350 ‐1.476 0.304 1.140 0.954 1.699 ‐0.717 ‐0.390 3.744
May‐09 Jul‐09 ‐0.783 ‐0.908 0.203 2.546 ‐2.413 1.120 ‐2.092 ‐0.128 8.719
Jun‐09 Aug‐09 ‐2.505 0.964 1.977 1.467 ‐2.317 ‐0.527 ‐1.384 ‐0.289 8.388
Jul‐09 Sep‐09 0.590 0.727 ‐1.016 1.676 ‐1.478 ‐0.133 0.426 0.518 5.990
Aug‐09 Oct‐09 1.235 2.794 ‐0.980 2.005 ‐2.431 ‐1.166 0.267 ‐0.031 4.087
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Start End constant libor‐ffr ffr ted ted*asw Basis MKTRF DEF TERM signedtv ted2*tv
Mar‐07 May‐07 ‐0.007 1.140 0.446 ‐1.035 1.043 0.216 0.002 ‐0.420 ‐0.009 0.033 0.412
Apr‐07 Jun‐07 ‐0.011 ‐0.243 0.790 ‐1.874 5.106 0.460 ‐0.014 ‐0.503 0.065 0.046 ‐0.110
May‐07 Jul‐07 ‐0.067 4.641 4.663 0.115 ‐2.412 0.631 ‐0.016 ‐0.704 0.025 0.057 0.275
Jun‐07 Aug‐07 ‐0.020 1.906 1.511 ‐1.508 0.659 0.178 ‐0.024 ‐0.900 0.035 0.066 0.016
Jul‐07 Sep‐07 0.011 0.423 ‐0.580 ‐2.578 2.301 0.254 ‐0.041 ‐1.131 0.050 0.064 ‐0.010
Aug‐07 Oct‐07 ‐0.001 0.777 0.202 ‐1.127 0.778 0.276 ‐0.018 ‐1.026 0.016 0.090 ‐0.018
Sep‐07 Nov‐07 0.007 ‐0.503 ‐0.464 0.095 ‐0.185 ‐0.059 0.002 ‐0.666 0.015 0.100 0.070
Oct‐07 Dec‐07 0.001 ‐0.382 ‐0.050 ‐0.039 ‐0.002 ‐0.003 ‐0.029 ‐0.663 0.028 0.088 0.059
Nov‐07 Jan‐08 0.000 ‐0.257 ‐0.037 ‐0.483 0.485 ‐0.195 ‐0.042 ‐0.528 0.139 0.075 0.075
Dec‐07 Feb‐08 ‐0.001 1.386 0.112 1.501 ‐0.863 ‐0.224 ‐0.015 ‐0.744 ‐0.003 0.090 ‐0.126
Jan‐08 Mar‐08 ‐0.010 2.310 1.278 ‐0.559 0.099 ‐0.111 ‐0.035 ‐0.781 0.011 0.113 ‐0.103
Feb‐08 Apr‐08 ‐0.012 3.895 1.667 ‐2.581 0.933 0.322 ‐0.072 ‐0.784 0.081 0.108 ‐0.120
Mar‐08 May‐08 0.008 1.496 ‐1.569 ‐2.732 1.444 ‐0.129 ‐0.117 ‐0.623 0.092 0.068 ‐0.030
Apr‐08 Jun‐08 ‐0.012 4.305 2.255 ‐6.985 3.087 0.256 ‐0.020 ‐0.533 0.210 0.059 ‐0.116
May‐08 Jul‐08 ‐0.020 4.501 3.625 ‐5.248 2.066 ‐0.050 ‐0.026 ‐0.571 0.255 0.064 ‐0.125
Jun‐08 Aug‐08 0.001 2.238 0.303 1.509 ‐1.660 ‐0.663 ‐0.043 ‐0.131 0.320 0.016 ‐0.033
Jul‐08 Sep‐08 0.005 1.422 0.139 ‐3.258 0.674 0.368 ‐0.011 ‐0.089 0.234 0.094 ‐0.023
Aug‐08 Oct‐08 0.004 0.535 ‐0.241 ‐1.031 0.321 0.343 0.007 0.072 0.337 0.156 ‐0.051
Sep‐08 Nov‐08 0.001 0.230 ‐0.530 ‐0.706 0.298 0.333 ‐0.025 ‐0.082 0.263 0.099 0.002
Oct‐08 Dec‐08 0.001 0.002 ‐1.290 1.019 ‐0.153 0.217 ‐0.034 0.126 0.938 0.067 0.032
Nov‐08 Jan‐09 0.000 1.937 ‐0.720 1.098 ‐0.633 ‐0.089 ‐0.030 ‐0.058 0.611 0.086 0.083
Dec‐08 Feb‐09 0.004 0.596 ‐8.394 5.413 ‐1.574 0.008 0.003 0.061 0.648 0.049 0.023
Jan‐09 Mar‐09 0.002 1.355 ‐4.665 5.818 ‐1.725 ‐0.060 ‐0.006 ‐0.008 0.525 0.055 ‐0.273
Feb‐09 Apr‐09 0.005 ‐0.431 ‐11.309 1.872 ‐0.245 0.133 ‐0.001 ‐0.009 0.207 0.033 ‐0.177
Mar‐09 May‐09 0.005 0.379 ‐9.181 1.407 ‐0.243 0.219 ‐0.029 0.009 0.394 0.003 ‐0.143
Apr‐09 Jun‐09 ‐0.001 ‐4.500 2.013 1.850 0.225 0.234 ‐0.022 ‐0.002 0.990 ‐0.014 0.031
May‐09 Jul‐09 ‐0.003 ‐2.506 1.751 7.430 ‐2.176 0.181 ‐0.051 0.004 1.220 ‐0.012 0.048
Jun‐09 Aug‐09 ‐0.006 2.327 10.628 2.993 ‐1.576 ‐0.046 ‐0.022 ‐0.037 1.159 0.020 0.011
Jul‐09 Sep‐09 0.001 1.944 ‐4.402 10.927 ‐5.568 ‐0.040 0.011 0.038 0.994 0.001 ‐0.094





Start End constant libor‐ffr ffr ted ted*asw Basis MKTRF DEF TERM signedtv ted2*tv
Mar‐07 May‐07 ‐0.102 0.289 0.100 ‐1.681 1.631 0.857 0.079 ‐5.302 ‐0.483 3.762 1.693
Apr‐07 Jun‐07 ‐0.216 ‐0.073 0.216 ‐1.741 2.487 2.045 ‐0.639 ‐6.056 1.864 3.362 ‐0.518
May‐07 Jul‐07 ‐2.720 2.971 2.743 0.142 ‐2.003 1.510 ‐0.726 ‐4.053 0.442 2.510 1.268
Jun‐07 Aug‐07 ‐1.612 3.229 1.757 ‐1.431 0.722 0.587 ‐1.110 ‐5.878 0.640 2.461 0.305
Jul‐07 Sep‐07 0.851 0.862 ‐0.674 ‐2.028 2.088 0.798 ‐1.654 ‐6.825 1.565 2.301 ‐0.216
Aug‐07 Oct‐07 ‐0.346 2.235 0.636 ‐1.445 1.260 1.403 ‐1.214 ‐11.036 0.397 6.066 ‐0.517
Sep‐07 Nov‐07 0.711 ‐0.757 ‐0.650 0.143 ‐0.429 ‐0.191 0.118 ‐4.593 0.223 4.106 1.646
Oct‐07 Dec‐07 0.312 ‐0.944 ‐0.184 ‐0.040 ‐0.004 ‐0.010 ‐1.485 ‐3.904 0.268 3.143 1.572
Nov‐07 Jan‐08 0.136 ‐0.623 ‐0.176 ‐0.339 0.485 ‐0.919 ‐1.850 ‐5.728 1.714 2.949 2.247
Dec‐07 Feb‐08 ‐0.531 1.780 0.394 1.450 ‐1.640 ‐0.943 ‐0.430 ‐6.909 ‐0.031 2.552 ‐1.608
Jan‐08 Mar‐08 ‐1.537 1.705 1.588 ‐0.297 0.115 ‐0.432 ‐0.839 ‐7.537 0.132 3.733 ‐0.895
Feb‐08 Apr‐08 ‐1.639 2.907 1.357 ‐1.406 1.329 0.926 ‐1.326 ‐7.163 0.784 3.103 ‐0.998
Mar‐08 May‐08 0.394 0.566 ‐0.432 ‐1.246 2.260 ‐0.432 ‐1.571 ‐5.666 1.143 2.003 ‐0.246
Apr‐08 Jun‐08 ‐1.134 2.644 1.159 ‐2.350 2.263 1.406 ‐0.740 ‐5.942 2.294 1.535 ‐1.873
May‐08 Jul‐08 ‐1.932 2.712 1.952 ‐3.131 3.193 ‐0.239 ‐1.646 ‐4.980 2.457 1.908 ‐2.405
Jun‐08 Aug‐08 0.092 2.194 0.164 1.446 ‐5.559 ‐3.368 ‐2.540 ‐1.073 3.158 0.425 ‐2.218
Jul‐08 Sep‐08 2.078 2.118 0.239 ‐2.950 2.120 1.296 ‐0.612 ‐0.822 1.589 1.901 ‐1.233
Aug‐08 Oct‐08 1.989 0.964 ‐0.615 ‐0.963 1.096 1.635 0.408 0.683 1.724 3.411 ‐2.614
Sep‐08 Nov‐08 1.034 0.290 ‐1.391 ‐0.545 1.182 1.927 ‐1.062 ‐0.647 0.872 1.670 0.075
Oct‐08 Dec‐08 0.943 0.002 ‐1.459 0.668 ‐0.464 1.379 ‐1.471 1.096 2.168 1.864 0.725
Nov‐08 Jan‐09 0.101 2.771 ‐0.587 0.708 ‐1.573 ‐0.463 ‐1.519 ‐0.506 3.498 2.488 3.802
Dec‐08 Feb‐09 2.708 0.368 ‐3.036 3.129 ‐2.665 0.054 0.196 0.670 4.773 1.803 0.835
Jan‐09 Mar‐09 0.821 1.268 ‐0.815 2.899 ‐2.912 ‐0.383 ‐0.383 ‐0.089 3.560 2.724 ‐2.442
Feb‐09 Apr‐09 1.508 ‐0.278 ‐1.587 1.557 ‐1.200 0.816 ‐0.055 ‐0.079 1.047 1.177 ‐1.512
Mar‐09 May‐09 1.903 0.234 ‐1.793 1.131 ‐0.877 1.623 ‐1.322 0.172 1.380 0.121 ‐1.295
Apr‐09 Jun‐09 ‐0.321 ‐1.248 0.365 0.808 0.921 1.720 ‐0.770 ‐0.055 4.691 ‐0.833 0.285
May‐09 Jul‐09 ‐0.780 ‐0.695 0.271 2.571 ‐2.293 1.285 ‐2.135 0.167 9.519 ‐0.785 0.357
Jun‐09 Aug‐09 ‐2.505 0.943 1.906 1.371 ‐1.932 ‐0.333 ‐0.985 ‐0.745 6.681 1.191 0.040
Jul‐09 Sep‐09 0.592 0.633 ‐1.025 1.649 ‐1.414 ‐0.263 0.419 0.371 5.147 0.066 ‐0.212
Aug‐09 Oct‐09 1.331 2.888 ‐1.051 2.096 ‐2.530 ‐1.438 0.379 ‐0.308 3.559 0.574 ‐0.267
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1day 0.08% 0.19% 2.90%
|RER_nbt| 1week 0.22% 0.46% 3.12%
1month 0.79% 1.24% 4.21%
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1day 0.172 0.110 0.173 0.204 0.281
|RER_nbt| 1week 0.362 0.271 0.450 0.463 0.707
1month 1.181 0.693 1.221 1.326 1.487





1day 0.192 0.186 0.158 0.224 0.259
|RER_nbt| 1week 0.537 0.384 0.397 0.472 0.707
1month 0.764 0.929 1.275 1.061 1.979





|RER_nbt| 1day 0.117 0.167 0.181 0.262 0.255





Vol_nbt 1day 0.072 0.138 0.177 0.243 0.263
1week 0.179 0.271 0.338 0.495 0.539
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Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
Period 1: 07/2007‐02/2008
estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat
constant 0.09 (2.27) 0.39 (3.82) ‐0.14 (‐1.83) ‐0.04 (‐0.62)
slope 0.00 (1.75) ‐0.01 (‐1.05) 0.00 (0.05) 0.02 (2.86)
adj.R^2 0.03 0.01 ‐0.01 0.09
Period 2: 03/2008‐03/2009
estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat
constant 0.13 (1.42) 0.01 (0.17) ‐0.92 (‐7.91) ‐1.01 (‐11.92)
slope 0.00 (‐0.04) 0.01 (2.30) 0.00 (0.99) 0.02 (6.98)
adj.R^2 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.39
Period 3: 04/2009‐09/2009
estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat
constant 0.02 (0.76) 0.05 (1.24) ‐0.98 (‐14.16) ‐1.25 (‐5.53)
slope 0.00 (7.07) 0.02 (10.81) 0.03 (6.55) 0.03 (4.29)
adj.R^2 0.60 0.60 0.38 0.46
1.6B
Regression Results of 5‐day Credit Spread Change on Slope of CS Term Structure
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4
Period 1: 07/2007‐02/2008
estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat
constant 0.00 (0.29) 0.17 (2.13) ‐0.22 (‐3.20) ‐0.01 (‐0.11)
slope 0.00 (2.87) 0.00 (0.37) 0.00 (0.37) 0.00 (0.39)
adj.R^2 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Period 2: 03/2008‐03/2009
estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat
constant 0.03 (0.84) ‐0.05 (‐1.03) ‐0.91 (‐8.63) ‐0.94 (‐17.79)
slope 0.00 (‐0.55) 0.01 (3.40) 0.00 (0.44) 0.01 (7.89)
adj.R^2 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.32
Period 3: 04/2009‐09/2009
estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat estimate Nwtstat
constant 0.00 (‐0.24) 0.20 (9.91) ‐0.88 (‐16.29) ‐1.05 (‐7.20)
slope 0.00 (3.16) 0.01 (14.11) 0.02 (5.61) 0.02 (5.89)
adj.R^2 0.22 0.72 0.29 0.54
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1.11 Appendix 1.D: Alternative Assumption for λt
To avoid the problem of having negative default intensity, assume the default inten-
sity is still λ˜+ λt, where λt follows:
dλt = κλ(λ¯− λt)dt+ σλ
√
λtdBλ,t (1.96)
Where κλ, λ¯ and σλ are positive constants, and Bλ,t is a Brownian Motion. The
drift term of the bond prices then change to:





























Substitute the above into the dynamic budget constraint, the F.O.C.s are:
µct(τ)− rt − hct(τ)
|xct(τ)|
xct(τ)






µdt (τ)− rt − hdt (τ)
|xdt (τ)|
xdt (τ)






















[−xdt (τ)Adr(τ)− xct(τ)Acr(τ)]dτ (1.103)
are the market prices of risks to the default jump, default intensity and short rate
factors.
Under constant demand pressure assumption, in equilibrium, markets clear. So
xit + z
i = 0, i = c, d. Replace xit(τ) by −zi(τ), and replace hit by the functions
defined in the funding cost section, then the F.O.C.s are affine equations in the risk
factors λt and rt. Setting the linear terms in λt and rt to zeros implies that the
parameters Aij(τ) in the conjectured bond prices are the solutions to a system of
73








































[zd(τ) + zc(τ)]dτ (1.105)
Acr





r(τ)− 1 = 0 (1.107)
Comparing to the simple mean-reverting λt used in the main text, the additional
square-root assumption adds a quadratic term of Aiλ to the coefficient of λt in the
drift term of the bond prices. It also adds a linear term of Aiλ to the coefficient of λt
on the right hand side of the F.O.C.. These changes the equation for Aiλ from simple
linear ODE to Riccati equation, which can still be solved in closed-form easily. Note
that the equations for Acλ and A
d
λ are symmetric but for the difference in parameter
αc and αd on the right hand side. Therefore, the solutions are symmetric but for
the difference in parameter αc and αd, just like under the simple mean-reverting
assumption in the main text. So the main conclusions on the expected excess return
of basis trading in Corollary 1.1 still hold.
However, the above results are derived under the assumption of constant demand
pressure. Under the stochastic demand pressure in Case 2, the right hand side
of the F.O.C.s will emerge a ztλt term that makes the system non-linear. In the
constant demand pressure case, the market price of risk contains square-root of the
variable, and the exposure to the risk factor also contains square-root of the variable,
so the risk premium is linear in the variable. However, under stochastic demand
pressure, the exposure to the risk factor still contains square-root of the variable,
but the market price of risk contains the square-root of one variable multiplied by
the linear term of the other variable, so the risk premium is no longer linear in the
variables. This problem cannot be resolved even if the conjectured price function
changes to include non-linear terms of the variables. Therefore, results in the main
text are still presented under the simple mean-reverting assumption for λt, even
though it has the drawback of creating negative default intensity.
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2 General Equilibrium Analysis of Stochastic Bench-
marking
Abstract
This paper applies a closed-form continuous-time consumption-based general equi-
librium model to analyze the equilibrium implications when some agents in the
economy promise to beat a stochastic benchmark at an intermediate date. For very
risky benchmark, these agents increase volatility and risk premium in the equilib-
rium. On the other hand, when they promise to beat less risky benchmark, they
decrease volatility and risk premium in the equilibrium. In both cases, the degree
of effect is state-dependent and stock price rises.
2.1 Introduction
This paper studies the equilibrium implications when some agents in the econ-
omy face stochastic benchmarking constraint. These constrained benchmarking
agents characterize fund managers who promise to beat a stochastic benchmark
at an intermediate date. Using the martingale approach, I solve a continuous-time
consumption-based general equilibrium model explicitly to get the equilibrium as-
sets prices, risk premium, volatility and optimal strategies in this benchmarking
economy featuring both normal unconstrained agents and constrained benchmark-
ing agents. I also compare these equilibrium quantities with those in a normal
economy featuring only normal unconstrained agents so as to highlight the impact
of the benchmarking constraint on the economy. To my knowledge, this is the first
paper to investigate the equilibrium effects of this type of benchmarking constraint.
The benchmarking constraint in this paper is a requirement that an agent’s wealth
at a pre-specified intermediate date is no less than a stochastic benchmark index.
The problem of beating a constant floor has been studied by the portfolio insurance
literature, e.g. the equilibrium analysis of portfolio insurance by Basak (1995) and
Grossman and Zhou (1996). However, the portfolio insurance constraint only en-
sures the agent doesn’t lose more than a certain level without asking for a higher
return when the economy is good. Fund manager’s performance is often evaluated
against a benchmark index. Facing this benchmarking constraint is equivalent to
promising to beat the performance of the benchmark index at a certain evaluation
date. The economy consists of two assets, a risk-free money market account and
a risky stock. The stochastic benchmark index is a replication portfolio using the
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money market account and the stock. Therefore, it is achievable through passive
management and the riskiness of the benchmark is measured by the positions in the
risk-free money market account.
After describing the finite horizon standard Lucas (1978) economy with an inter-
mediate constraint date, I first characterize the portfolio choice problems for the
normal agents and the constrained agents. The approach is the martingale rep-
resentation approach as in Cox and Huang (1989) and Basak (1995). Then I get
explicit solutions for the equilibrium market dynamics under log utility using the
martingale approach for option pricing and Ito’s lemma. This paper adopts simi-
lar set-ups as in Basak (1995), but the alternative consideration of the stochastic
benchmark complicates the calculation of equilibrium quantities and the discussion
of equilibrium effects.
I find that in the benchmarking economy before the constraint date, the stock price
is higher than that in the normal economy because the constrained agents consume
less than if they’re not constrained. Since the money market account is in zero net
supply, the extra investment from the constrained agents goes into the stock market
and drives up the stock price before the constraint date. The increase in stock price
also reflects the constrained agents’ preferences for consumption and dividend after
the constraint date.
If the benchmark is risky, which means the replication portfolio of the benchmark
index has a short position in the money market account, then the risk premium
and volatility are higher than those in the normal economy. Moreover, the optimal
fraction of wealth invested in the stock by the constrained agent is higher than that
of the unconstrained normal agent. While if the benchmark is safe, which means
the replication portfolio of the benchmark index has positive position in the money
market account, then the risk premium and volatility are lower than those in the
normal economy, and the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset by
the constrained agent is lower than that of the unconstrained normal agent. In both
cases, the degree of the effect is state-dependent.
The rationale behind these findings is that the presence of the benchmarking con-
straint results in more (or less) demand for the stock from the constrained agent,
then the volatility has to increase (or decrease) so as to induce unconstrained normal
agents to change their demand and clear the market. It is also because that the
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stock price in this economy is equal to the normal economy price plus the present
value of an option-like payoff that represents the effects from the benchmarking con-
straint. For the risky benchmark case, the extra payoff is like a call option payoff
and the effect is thus volatility increasing; but for the safe benchmark case, the extra
payoff is like a put option payoff and the effect becomes volatility decreasing. From
the modeling aspect, the market price of risk is constant and the SPDs before the
constraint date are not directly affected by the existence of the constraint due to the
use of the consumption good as numeraire and the existence of intermediate divi-
dend for consumption, which are not true in some other papers that have contrary
conclusions for certain parts of the model, for instance Grossman and Zhou (1996).
However, the conclusion of this paper is consistent with that for the portfolio insur-
ance model of Basak (1995), which has the similar set-up and approach with this
paper.
The closest literatures are the equilibrium analysis of portfolio insurance by Basak
(1995) and Grossman and Zhou (1996). Basak (1995) builds a similar consumption-
based general equilibrium model and compares the explicit expressions for equilib-
rium market dynamics in the portfolio insurance economy with those in the normal
economy. The portfolio insurers’ strategies are similar to the synthetic put approach
and the presence of the intermediate portfolio insurance constraints decreases the
risk premium, volatility and optimal fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset.
The use of log utility ensures the SPDs are not affected by the constraints since they
are derived by market clearing of intermediate consumption. In contrast, Grossman
and Zhou (1996) adopts a different set-up in which the portfolio insurance con-
straint is on the final date and there’s no intermediate consumption so agents only
care about consumption at the final date which is financed by a lump-sum of divi-
dend. Therefore, the pricing kernels before the final date are directly affected by the
constraint and that makes the overall effect of portfolio insurance to be increasing
risk premium and volatility. However, the use of bond price as the numeraire results
in different predictions with Basak (1995) and makes the model impossible to be
solved explicitly. As mentioned above, these two papers only consider the case of
portfolio insurance which is benchmarking on a constant floor while Tepla (2001)
studies the optimal portfolio choice of an agent who performs against a stochastic
benchmark similar to the one considered here but doesn’t derive the equilibrium
results.
The general topic of optimal strategy and asset pricing implications of constrained
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or benchmarking institutional investors have been explored by a number of papers.
Basak and Shapiro (2001) reveal in a general equilibrium model that VaR risk man-
agers amplify volatility in poor market and attenuate volatility in good market.
Basak and Chabakauri (2012) provide a new framework that derives the optimal
strategy of portfolio managers who care about their tracking error to a benchmark.
Basak and Pavlova (2012) show that institutional investors favor stocks that com-
prise their benchmark index and amplify the index stock volatilities and aggregate
stock market volatility.
In the rest of the paper, Section 2.2 presents the model and characterizes the op-
timization problems of agents. Section 2.3 solves for the equilibrium and shows
the main effects of the benchmarking constraint on the economy. Then Section 2.4
presents more discussion on the equilibrium effects before Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The Economy
In a finite horizon [0, T ′] pure-exchange economy, all quantities are in units of a
consumption good. Let B denote a Brownian Motion on a complete probability
space (Ω,F ,P). Let {Ft; t ∈ [0, T ′]} be the augmentation by null sets of the filtration
generated by B, which represents all uncertainties in the economy. Prior to T ′, some
agents face a constraint at the constraint date T , which will be specified later.
2.2.2 Securities
The economy consists of two assets. S0 is a risk-less money market account in zero
net supply that pays interest at rate rt, which is to be determined in the equilibrium,
and S is a risky stock in constant net supply of 1 and pays dividend at an exogenous
rate of δt in [0, T
′]. Assume that the dividend process follows a Geometric Brownian
Motion.
dδt = δt(µδdt+ σδdBt), t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.1)
where µδ and σδ are both constants. Similar to Basak (1995), I anticipate a price
discontinuity in equilibrium around the intermediate constraint date T .22 Therefore,
I model the stock price as a diffusion process with an FT -measurable jump at time
T :
dSt + δtdt = St(µtdt+ σtdBt + qdAt), t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.2)
22For more intuition, see the section for equilibrium
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And ST ′ = 0. Here, At is the right-continuous step function defined by At ≡ 1t≥T ,
and the FT -measurable random variable q is the jump size parameter, defined as
q = ln(ST /ST−), where ST− denotes the left limit of ST . As explained in Basak
(1995), the above specifications ensure that the stock price has continuous local
martingale part and discontinuous bounded variation part that contains an FT -




0dAt), t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.3)
By construction, the jump sizes are revealed immediately before the jumps occur.
So to rule out arbitrage, q = q0.
2.2.3 State Price Density















where θt = (µt−rt)/σt is the market price of risk. The SPD process which represents
the price of consumption also contains a jump, which is of the opposite direction of
jumps in asset prices.23 Apply Ito’s lemma to pit gives:
dpit = −pit(rtdt+ θtdBt + qdAt), t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.5)








pisδsds | Ft], t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.6)
2.2.4 Agents
The economy has two types of agents, i.e. agent type n and agent type m. Type n
agent is the normal agent, while type m is referred to as the constrained agent later
on. Each type has infinite number of agents that form a continuum with measure
1. Each agent belonging to type n or type m is endowed with initial wealth xn0 or
xm0 at time zero respectively.
24 Let Xit denote the wealth of an agent of type i at
23Because asset prices are in units of consumption goods, when asset prices jump downward,
SPD as the price of consumption jumps upward, and the product of piS remains continuous.
24The endowment can be in the form of shares of the stock, each type n and type m agents’
endowed shares of stock worth xn0 and xm0, which add up to the stock price at time 0.
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time t, i = n,m, then Xit follows:
dXit = (1−Φit)Xit(rtdt+qdAt)+ΦitXit(µtdt+σtdBt+qdAt)−citdt, t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.7)
where Φit denotes the fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset and cit is the
consumption process for agent i. Both type of agents have time-additive state-
independent utility function over consumption. The function u(cit) is the same for
all agents and is continuous with continuous first derivatives, strictly increasing,
strictly concave. Hereafter, denote all optimal quantities with a caret (ˆ). The







piscˆisds | Ft], t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.8)
In this model, a type n agent is the normal agent. But a type m agent is the con-
strained agent who faces a stochastic benchmarking constraint at time T so that
she has to maintain her time T wealth above a stochastic benchmark index aST + b,
where a and b are exogenously given constants. For a type m agent, the constraint
is XmT− ≥ aST + b, where XmT− is the left limit of XmT .25
Although the parameters a and b are exogenous, the benchmark index value aST +b
is endogenous. Type m agents characterize fund managers who promise investors
to beat a benchmark index at a given evaluation date (time T ). The value of b
characterizes the riskiness of the benchmark. As will be explained in more details
in latter sections, an unconstrained investor with log utility will optimally choose to
invest all wealth in the stock, so b < 0 suggests the benchmark is more risky than
the agent’s original strategy; and b > 0 means the benchmark is relatively safe as
it contains positive position in the money market account while the agent’s original
strategy doesn’t. The parameter values a and b have important implications on the
equilibrium properties.
2.2.5 The Optimization Problems







25The idea of comparing time T− wealth against time T benchmark value may be confusing at
first glance, but in equilibrium ST = (T
′−T )δT−, so the constraint is effectively requiring time T−





piscnsds] ≤ pi0xn0 (2.10)
Assuming a solution exists, the optimal consumption is simply:
cˆnt = I(λnpit) t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.11)




pisI(λnpis)ds] = pi0xn0 (2.12)
Alternatively, a constrained agent faces an additional benchmarking constraint as














piscmsds | FT ] ≤ piT−xmT− almost surely, (2.15)
XmT− ≥ aST + b almost surely (2.16)
Lemma 2.1. Assuming a solution exists, a constrained agent’s optimal consumption
is:
cˆmt = I(λm1pit) t ∈ [0, T ) (2.17)
cˆmt = I(λm2pit) t ∈ [T, T ′] (2.18)





















N.B. (1) λn, λm1 are constants, λm2 is an FT -measurable random variable. (2) If
xn0 = xm0, then λm1 ≥ λn. (3) λm1 = λm2 if the benchmarking constraint is not
binding; λm1 > λm2 if it is binding.
Proof. see Appendix 2.
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The above results suggest if a constrained agent is equally endowed as a normal
agent, then the constrained agent consumes less before the constraint date than the
normal agent so as to ensure her wealth at the constraint date is higher than the
benchmark value. If the constraint is binding, then the constrained agent no longer
restricts her consumption after the constraint date so it may rise.
2.3 The Equilibrium
2.3.1 Market Clearing Conditions
The equilibrium conditions are the market clearing of consumption goods, the mar-
ket clearing of the money market account and the market clearing of the stock.
These conditions imply that the aggregate optimal consumption from all agents
adds up to the dividend:
δt = cˆnt + cˆmt t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.21)
Following this equilibrium condition, the SPD satisfies the following equations:
δt = I(λnpit) + I(λm1pit) t ∈ [0, T ) (2.22)
δt = I(λnpit) + I(λm2pit) t ∈ [T, T ′] (2.23)




















t ∈ [T, T ′] (2.25)
Applying Ito’s lemma on pit which follows the dynamics in equation (2.5), I solve
for the following equilibrium quantities as:
rt = µδ − σ2δ (2.26)












) ≤ 0 (2.28)
The short-rate rt and market price of risk θt are constants. Hereafter, denote
rt = µδ − σ2δ = r and θt = σδ = θ.
26For simplicity, I only consider log-utility while similar approach can be applied to power and
negative exponential utilities.
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The SPD has an upward jump at time T . This jump is necessary for the equi-
librium condition to hold. If the SPD is continuous, the normal agent’s demand
for consumption will also be continuous. But when type m agent’s benchmarking
constraint is binding, since λm1 > λm2 and cˆmT− = 1/λm1piT−, cˆmT = 1/λm2piT , her
demand for consumption will jump upwards immediately after time T , resulting in
the aggregate demand for consumption jumping upwards, which is impossible since
the dividend process is continuous. Hence, there must be a jump in the SPD to
smooth the constrained agent’s demand for consumption. And the jump in SPD is
upward because the constrained agent values consumption after the constraint date
more than before the date.
As mentioned above, the other two equilibrium conditions are the market clear-
ing of the money market account and the market clearing of the stock. The money
market account is in zero net supply, so the aggregate optimal wealth invested into
the money market account adds up to zero in the equilibrium. On the other hand,
the stock is in a supply of 1, so the aggregate optimal wealth invested into the stock
adds up to the stock price. Recall that Xˆnt and Xˆmt denote the optimal wealth of
agents and Φˆnt and Φˆmt denote the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the stock,
the above two equilibrium conditions imply:
0 = Xˆnt(1− Φˆnt) + Xˆmt(1− Φˆmt) (2.29)
St = XˆntΦˆnt + XˆmtΦˆmt (2.30)
Combining the above two equations implies that the stock price is the sum of all
agents’ optimal wealth.
St = Xˆnt + Xˆmt (2.31)
2.3.2 Asset Prices
In this section, I derive explicit solutions for the equilibrium stock price. Then in
the following sections, I provide explicit solutions to the risk premium, volatility
and agents’ optimal fraction of wealth invested into stock. For each equilibrium
quantity, I also provide results under a normal economy consisting only normal
agents to compare with the results under this benchmarking economy with both
normal and constrained agents. Hereafter, denote equilibrium quantities under the
normal economy with a bar (¯ ).
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Lemma 2.2. In the normal economy, the equilibrium stock price is:
S¯t = (T
′ − t)δt t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.32)
In the benchmarking economy, after the constraint date (t ∈ [T, T ′]), the stock price
St is the same as that in the normal economy:
St = (T
′ − t)δt t ∈ [T, T ′] (2.33)
But before the constraint date (t ∈ [0, T )), the stock price is no less than that in the
normal economy:
St = S¯t +
1
pit
E[piT−max{aST + b− λn
λn + λm1
(T ′ − T )δT−, 0}|Ft] (2.34)
≥ S¯t t ∈ [0, T ) (2.35)
Proof. see Appendix 2.
In the benchmarking economy before the constraint date, the stock price could be
higher than that in the normal economy because the stock price is the aggregate
amount of invested wealth, which reflects the present value of aggregate future con-
sumptions. In this benchmarking economy, agents value consumption after the con-
straint date time T more than before the constraint date. This concern is reflected
in the SPDs and then may results in a higher stock price than in the normal economy.
Now focus on the explicit solution of St for t ∈ [0, T ). From the equation (2.49),
ST = (T
′ − T )δT , and by the continuity of δt, δT− = δT . So, replace ST by
(T ′ − T )δT−, equation (2.53) becomes:
St = (T




)(T ′ − T )δT− + b, 0}|Ft] (2.36)
Since the process δt is a Geometric Brownian Motion, I apply the martingale ap-
proach to take the expectation in equation (2.36). Hereafter, assume (a− λnλn+λm1 )b <
0, which means there’s always uncertainty over the relative performance of the un-
constrained strategy against the benchmark index aST+b. This assumption excludes
the cases where either the constraint will never bind (b < 0 and a − λnλn+λm1 < 0),
in which case the constrained agent always behaves the same as the unconstrained
one, or the constraint will always bind (b > 0 and a − λnλn+λm1 > 0), in which case
the constrained agent will just hold the benchmark index. Now, the stock price St
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is solved from equation (2.36) as:
Proposition 2.1. In the benchmarking economy, for t ∈ [0, t):
St = (T
′ − t)δt + (a− λn
λn + λm1
)(T ′ − T )N [− b|b|z1]δt + be
−r(T−t)N [− b|b|z2] (2.37)
where








N(·) is the distribution function of normal random variable. And the optimal in-
vested wealth of agent m at time t is:
Xˆmt = St − Xˆnt = St − λm1
λn + λm1
(T ′ − t)δt (2.38)
Proof. see Appendix 2.
2.3.3 Volatility and Risk Premium
Applying Ito’s lemma on St provides explicit solutions for the volatility and risk
premium in both the normal and benchmarking economy.
Proposition 2.2. In the normal economy, for t ∈ [0, T ′], the stock return volatility
σ¯t and risk premium µ¯t − r are:
σ¯t = σδ (2.39)
µ¯t − r = σ2δ (2.40)
In the benchmarking economy, after the constraint date (t ∈ [T, T ′]), the stock return
volatility σt and risk premium µt − r are the same as those in the normal economy:
σt = σδ (2.41)
µt − r = σ2δ (2.42)
But before the constraint date (t ∈ [0, T )), the stock return volatility and risk pre-










Proof. see Appendix 2.
Before the constraint date, whether the volatility and risk premium in the bench-
marking economy are higher or lower than those in the normal economy only depends
on the sign of the fraction term inside the bracket in the above set of equations.
Corollary 2.1. Before the constraint date (t ∈ [0, T )): for b < 0 (b > 0), the
volatility and risk premium in the benchmarking economy are higher (lower) than
those in the normal economy.
Proof. see Appendix 2.
The volatility and risk premium in the normal economy are constant. However, now
they become stochastic in the presence of the stochastic benchmarking constraint.
As will be explained in more details in latter sections, b < 0 means the benchmark
index is risky while b > 0 means the benchmark index is safe. The above corollary
suggests that when some agents in the economy promise to beat risky benchmark,
they increase volatility and risk premium in the equilibrium. On the other hand,
when they promise to beat safe benchmark, they decrease volatility and risk pre-
mium in the equilibrium. In both cases, the degree of the increase or decrease is
state-dependent as the N(z2) and St terms both depend on δt. The value of volatil-
ity and risk premium are also affected by the parameter a in the stochastic index, as
both z2 and St contains a. To better understand the results for volatility, I further
investigate agents’ optimal strategies.
2.3.4 The Optimal Strategy
Denote the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset by Φˆnt and Φˆmt for
agent of type n and agent of type m. Applying Ito’s lemma on pitXˆnt and pitXˆmt
provides explicit solutions for Φˆnt and Φˆmt in the benchmarking economy. I also
provide results in the normal economy for comparison.
Proposition 2.3. In the normal economy, the normal agent optimally invest all
her wealth in the stock.
In the benchmarking economy, for the normal agent n, the optimal fraction of wealth
invested in the stock is:
Φˆnt = (µt − r)/σ2t (2.45)
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While for the constrained agent m, after the constraint date (t ∈ [T, T ′]), the optimal
fraction of wealth invested in the stock is the same as that of the normal agent:
Φˆmt = Φˆnt = (µt − r)/σ2t (2.46)
Before the constraint date (t ∈ [0, T )), the optimal fraction of wealth invested in the








Proof. see Appendix 2.
Corollary 2.2. In the benchmarking economy before the constraint date (t ∈ [0, T )):
for b < 0 (b > 0), the constrained agent invests more (less) fraction of wealth in
the risky asset than the normal agent. And both agents’ optimal fraction of wealth
invested in the risky asset are now stochastic.
Proof. see Appendix 2.
2.4 Discussion of the Equilibrium
In the normal economy, agents invest all their wealth into the stock. In the ben-
chamrking economy, the benchmark faced by some agents is aST + b, so a = 1 and
b = 0 corresponds to a strategy that replicates the normal agent’s behavior in the
normal economy. If the benchmark has parameter b < 0, this is equivalent to a
strategy involving borrowing in the money market account to invest in stock. Such
a strategy is riskier than the normal agent’s behavior in the normal economy. There-
fore, such a benchmark is regarded as a risky benchmark. On the other hand, if
b > 0, this is equivalent to investing less in the stock but more in the money market
account, comparing with the normal agent’s behavior in the normal economy. Such
a benchmark is regarded as safe.
The existence of risky benchmark increases risk premium and volatility condition-
ally, while a safe benchmark decreases these terms. In both cases, the risky asset
price is higher in the presence of the benchmarking constraint than in the normal
economy. The conclusion here is consistent with that of Basak (1995), in which the
portfolio insurance constraint can be viewed as a special case of the benchmarking
constraint studied here.
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Such findings may be contrary to conventional wisdom, e.g. Grossman and Zhou
(1996), which says the inclusion of the portfolio insurance constrained agent should
increase volatility and risk premium. However, the results here are understandable
in the following ways:
Firstly, seen from Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.2, the effect of volatility can
be explained by the optimal fractions of wealth invested in the stock by both agents.
In the normal economy, both agents optimally invest all their wealth into the stock.
In the benchmarking economy, with safe benchmark, the constrained agents have
to invest less in the stock so as to hold some risk-free asset. To clear the market,
the normal agents have to buy more stock than they would in the normal economy.
Since Φˆnt = (µt − r)/σ2t = θ/σt, the only way to make the normal agent hold more
stock is to decrease σt. If the benchmark is risky, the constrained agents have to
hold more stock. So the volatility has to increase to induce the unconstrained agents
to hold less stock than they would in the normal economy. The above mentioned
rationale suggests that in the benchmarking economy which has a constant market
price of risk (θ), the volatility of the stock has to decrease (or increase) so as to
make the stock more (or less) attractive to the normal agent. Since the constrained
agents have to adjust their demand for the stock conditionally, the degree to which
the volatility is increased or decreased is therefore state-dependent.
For b < 0, agent m is more constrained in good states, so the effects on equilib-
rium dynamics are stronger in good states. While for b > 0, the agent is more
constrained in bad states, so the effects are stronger in bad states.
In another attempt to explain the results on volatility, recall the expression for
St before T in equation (2.36). The stock price in the benchmarking economy is
the normal economy price plus an expectation term which is the present value of an
option-like payoff, which is a call option payoff when the benchmark is risky, and a
put option payoff when the benchmark is safe. In the risky benchmark case, when
the market goes down the call option value goes down as well so the stock price falls
even further. Therefore, the constraint destabilizes price and increases volatility.
However, for the safe benchmark case, when the market goes down, the put option
value goes up, which helps stabilize stock price. So the volatility is decreased in the
presence of the constraint.
The results for the safe benchmark case is consistent with Basak (1995) which has
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the similar set-up in using consumption as numeraire and having intermediate con-
sumption, dividend and constraint date. These features result in a constant market
price of risk as compared to the price of consumption. But in Grossman and Zhou
(1996), the market price of risk is time-varying as they used bond price as numeraire
and there’s no intermediate consumption so the pre-constraint pricing kernels are
conditional expectations of the final one and therefore directly affected by the con-
straint. Therefore, the volatility is affected by both the change in market price of
risk and the change in agent’s risk aversion, and they show that the overall effect is
a higher volatility.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the equilibrium effect of a stochastic benchmarking constraint.
The economy has normal agents with log utility over continuous consumption and
constrained agents whose wealth at an intermediate date must lie above a stochastic
benchmark index. Using the martingale approach, I solve this consumption-based
general equilibrium model in closed form to get the equilibrium assets prices, risk
premium, volatility, optimal strategy and compare them with those in a normal
economy. The problem of the equilibrium effects of portfolio insurance studied by
Basak (1995) and Grossman and Zhou (1996) is a special case of the problem stud-
ied here.
The constrained agents can be understood as fund managers who promise investors
to beat a benchmark index that is achievable through passive management. When
they promise to beat risky benchmark, they increase volatility and risk premium in
the equilibrium. On the other hand, when they promise to beat safe benchmark,
they decrease volatility and risk premium in the equilibrium. In both cases, the
degree of the increase or decrease is state-dependent.
The rationale behind these findings is that when there’s more (less) demand for
the stock from the constrained agent, the volatility has to increase (decrease) so as
to clear the market. This is true because in this model the market price of risk is
constant and the SPDs before the constraint date are not directly affected by the
existence of the constraint due to the existence of intermediate dividend for con-
sumption. The model has consistent results with the portfolio insurance model of
Basak (1995) that has the similar set-up and approach with this paper.
Further development of this paper may include numerically analyzing the equilib-
89
rium effect of the benchmarking constraint under the Grossman and Zhou (1996)
set up, in which the constraint directly affect the SPDs, and studying more realistic
variation of the benchmarking constraint allowing for tracking errors.
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2.7 Appendix 2: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
2.1. Proof of Lemma 2.1
Replacing K in Basak (1995)’s proof of Lemma 3 by aST + b proves Lemma 2.1.
2.2. Proof of Lemma 2.2











= (T ′ − t)δt t ∈ [0, T ′] (2.48)
In the benchmarking economy, the stock price St is derived for the two horizons
t ∈ [T, T ′] and t ∈ [0, T ) separately. For t ∈ [T, T ′], taking the optimal consumption
solutions into equation (2.8) gives the stock price St as:































)(T ′ − t)
= (T ′ − t)δt
= S¯t (2.49)
In the benchmarking economy, for t ∈ [0, T ):
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(T ′ − t)δt + λn
λn + λm1
(T − t)δt + λn
λn + λm1




E[piT−max{aST + b− λn
λn + λm1




E[piT−max{aST + b− λn
λn + λm1
(T ′ − T )δT−, 0}|Ft] (2.53)
≥ S¯t
2.3. Proof of Proposition 2.1





)(T ′ − T )δT− + b, 0}|Ft] (2.54)








θ2sds} = pitS0t (2.55)






)(T ′ − T )δT− + b, 0}|Ft] (2.56)
Since the process δt is a Geometric Brownian Motion, the above term can be cal-
culated similarly as Black-Scholes option prices. When b < 0 and a − λnλn+λm1 > 0,
it is equivalent to Black-Scholes European Call Option Price; when b > 0 and a −
λn
λn+λm1
< 0, it is equivalent to Black-Scholes European Put Option Price. Sum-
marizing the above two cases, it can be integrated explicitly as (a − λnλn+λm1 )(T ′ −
T )N [− b|b|z1]δt + be−r(T−t)N [− b|b|z2] where z1 and z2 are as in Proposition 2.1.
2.4. Proof of Proposition 2.2
By definition dS¯t + δtdt = S¯t(µ¯tdt + σ¯tdBt) and dSt + δtdt = St(µtdt + σtdBt), t ∈
[0, T ) and t ∈ [T, T ′]. Apply Ito’s lemma on the explicit solution of S¯t and St, take
the diffusion terms into the above equations. Matching the diffusion terms solves
for the volatility σ¯t and σt respectively. Then use the relationship that (µ¯t−r)/σ¯t =
θ¯t = σδ and (µt − r)/σt = θt = σδ to derive the risk premium µ¯t − r and µt − r.
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2.5. Proof of Corollary 2.1
−e−r(T−t)N [− b|b|z2] < 0, so for b < 0, [1−
be−r(T−t)N [− b|b| z2]
St
] > 1 and vice versa.
2.6. Proof of Proposition 2.3
Applying Ito’s lemma on the product pitXˆt gives
d(pitXˆit) + pitcˆitdt = pitXˆit(Φˆitσt − θt)dBt (2.57)
i = n,m. Then apply Ito’s lemma on the products of pitXˆnt and pitXˆmt, take the
results into the above equation, then equaling the diffusion terms solves for Φˆnt and
Φˆmt.
2.7. Proof of Corollary 2.2
Same as the proof of Corollary 2.1.
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3 Institutional Asset Pricing with Heterogenous Belief
Abstract
We propose an equilibrium asset pricing model in which investors with heteroge-
neous beliefs care about relative performance. We find that the relative performance
concern leads agents to trade more similarly, which has two effects. First, similar
trading directly decreases volatility. Second, similar trading decreases the impact
of the dominant agents. When the economy is extremely good or bad, the sec-
ond effect is dominant so that the relative performance concern enlarges the excess
volatility caused by heterogeneous beliefs. When the first effect is dominant, which
corresponds to a normal economy, the volatility is lower than without the relative
performance concern. Moreover, this paper shows that the relative performance
concern also influences investors’ holdings, stock prices and risk premia. 27
3.1 Introduction
Fund managers care about their relative performance compared to their peer group.
In the fund management industry, the compensation for the money managers could
be a fixed proportion of the assets under management, or a fixed proportion plus
performance-based rewards. Under fixed contract, managers care not only about
the trading profit but also about the fund flows. Empirical evidence, such as in
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Huang, Wei and Yan
(2007), shows the positive and convex relationship between the fund flows and the
relative performance. In reality, fund of fund investors’ decisions depend on fund
managers’ rankings. Under performance based contracts, peer group performance
is often used as benchmark in evaluating manager performance.
In the literature of delegated portfolio management, most people focus on how the
relative performance affects risk taking behaviors and the equilibrium implications
of the asset prices (as discussed below). However, how relative performance could
affect the trading generated from difference of opinions remains uncertain. It is
difficult to solve for the asset pricing implications with endogenous fund flows. We
instead assume that managers receive a bonus/penalty based on their relative per-
formance comparing to their peers.28 In a dynamic general equilibrium model with
27This paper was jointly co-authored with Mr. Shiyang Huang, Dr. Zhigang Qiu and Dr. Ke
Tang. Huang is from LSE, Qiu and Tang are from Hanqing Advanced Institute of Economics and
Finance, Renmin University of China.
28Our assumption is consistent with the observation of mutual fund managers’ compensation by
Ma, Tang and Gomez (2012), and takes both fixed (AUM related) and performance based contracts
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heterogeneous beliefs, we analyze the effects of the relative performance concern on
equilibrium quantities.
We consider a continuous time, finite horizon economy with two assets, interpreted
as the risky stock and the risk-free bond, respectively. There are two groups of risk-
averse agents, interpreted as fund managers, who optimally allocate their wealth
between two assets to maximize their utility at the final date. Each manager in a
certain group is identical; she has a CRRA utility function over both the final wealth
and the relative performance compared to managers in the other group. We adopt
the standard exchange economy with the Lucas (1978) type of aggregate dividends,
which follow the geometric Brownian motion. The heterogeneous beliefs come from
two groups of agents’ different opinions about the drift process of the dividend.
We solve the model in closed form by assuming that the risk aversion coefficient
is an integer. To illustrate our result and compare with the benchmark case with
only heterogeneous belief but not relative performance, we focus on a special case in
which the risk aversion coefficient is equal to 2. We first analyze the stock holdings,
specifically, the relative performance leads agents to trade more similarly. When
the relative performance is infinitely strong, both groups of agents submit the same
demand. The result is the same as the economy with one representative agent
whose beliefs are the average for the economy. The relative performance affects
the way that two groups of agents share the final dividend, and hence affects their
expectations for the final wealth. Note that the expectations are conditional on the
current state of the world. When both groups of agents believe that the economy
is very good, on expectation, the pessimistic group of agents with relative perfor-
mance holds more shares than the agents without relative performance, while the
optimistic group of agents holds fewer shares. Thus, in this case, the pessimistic
group of agents has more impact compared to the benchmark case. Perceiving this,
the optimistic group of agents tends to demand less relative to the benchmark case,
and the pessimistic group of agents also demands less. When both groups of agents
believe that they are in a very bad economy, the opposite is true. In some cases, the
two groups of agents can disagree with each other regarding the status of the econ-
omy, thus the optimistic group tends to demand fewer stocks and the pessimistic
demands more.
Regarding the market price of risk, we show that when the economy is good, the
into consideration.
96
optimistic group of agents possesses less wealth with relative performance than they
do without relative performance. Therefore, although the optimistic group of agents
still dominates the market, the stock is less overvalued with relative performance.
Hence, the market price of risk is higher with relative performance than it is without
relative performance. When the economy is bad, by a similar logic, the market price
of risk is lower than it is without relative performance. Moreover, the model also
indicates that the market price of risks is counter-cyclical for both groups of agents.
The stock price is also affected by the relative performance. When the economy
is very good (bad), the stock price is lower (higher) with relative performance than
it is without relative performance. This result is the aggregate of the stock holdings.
When both groups of agents believe that the economy is good, both groups hold
fewer shares relative to the benchmark case, and hence, the aggregate demand is
less and the stock price is lower. When both groups of agents believe that they are
in a bad economy, the opposite is true. When the two groups disagree regarding
whether it is a good or a bad economy, the stock price could either be higher or
lower than the price without relative performance.
The relative performance also affects the stock volatility. When the economy is
normal, the volatility is smaller relative to the benchmark case; however, in the
extreme economy, it is larger. Relative performance leads agents to trade similarly,
which has two effects. On the one hand, it makes the agents trade more similarly,
which has the direct effect of decreasing the stock volatility, and this effect is dom-
inant on normal days; on the other hand, it decreases the impact of the dominant
group of agents,29 which is dominant in the extreme economy. As a result, the
volatility is larger with relative performance than it is without relative performance
in the extreme economy. This result is consistent with the scenario of financial crisis.
One application of our model regards price impact and the survival of irrational
traders. This issue can be analyzed by assuming that one group of agents are ra-
tional and correct in their belief, and the other group of agents are irrational and
with the wrong belief. The case without relative performance is analyzed by Kogan,
Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2006) who demonstrate the range where the irrational
traders can survive. In our paper, the irrational traders have a higher survival prob-
ability in the presence of relative performance because they trade more similarly to




Our paper is closely related to the asset pricing literature with heterogeneous beliefs
and delegated portfolio management. For asset pricing with heterogeneous beliefs,
the general framework is by Basak (2001, 2005), in which two agents disagree with
the drift of the dividend’s process. Other researchers consider the framework in
which one agent has the correct belief, and the other has the incorrect one, for ex-
ample, Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield (2006) and Yan (2008). Those papers
examine the mis-pricing caused by the agent with the incorrect belief. Moreover,
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) combine the heterogeneous beliefs and the short sales
constraints and show that this combination can create bubbles. Our paper combines
Basak’s framework with the relative performance and examines the equilibrium as-
set prices.
Delegated portfolio management literature is a growing field of research, which is
reasonable because a large fraction of the financial assets are held by institutional in-
vestors (Allen, 2000). Therefore, it is important for us to consider how the behavior
of institutions affects asset prices. In the literature, most of people consider mod-
els that have a single representative fund manager. For example, Vayanos (2004),
Vayanos and Woolley (2008), and He and Krishnamurthy (2009, 2010) belong to this
category. Because there is only one agent, the relative performance does not matter.
For the investigation of relative performance, researchers either use the relative
performance compared to some exogenous benchmark, or the relative performance
within the peer group, which is the same as is our paper. For example, Cuoco
and Kaniel (2010), Shang (2008) and Basak and Pavlova (2010) consider the rel-
ative performance compared to a passive benchmark, e.g., the S&P 500. On the
other hand, Kapur and Timmermann (2005), Basak and Makarov (2009, 2010) and
Kaniel and Kondor (2009) consider the relative performance within a peer group of
managers. All of these papers, however, consider only how the relative performance
might affect the risk taking behaviors of investors. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first to investigate how the relative performance affects the trading
behavior generated by a difference of opinions.
Some papers study the asset pricing model with asymmetric information in which
the agents either know or do not know. For example, Dasgupta and Prat (2006,
2008) show that career concerns can increase uninformed trading and slow down
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the information revelation process, and Guerreri and Kondor (2010) show that ca-
reer concerns can generate a ‘reputation premium’ for the bond return and hence
increase the volatility of bond prices. In some sense, the relative performance con-
cerns are similar to reputation concerns. Our paper, which is different from those,
considers the case that agents either agree or disagree with their observations (i.e.,
heterogeneous beliefs).
Generally speaking, our paper is also related to the literature of ‘social status’,
which considers the asset pricing implications when the investors care about the
status of their wealth relative to the average of the society. For example, Bakshi
and Chen (1996) examine the impact of social status on portfolio and consumption
choices. In our model, two groups of agents want to beat the average (or each
other) which is, in some sense, very similar to the concerns regarding social status.
In Bakshi and Chen (1996), the average wealth level of the society is exogenously
given, but in our model the average level is endogenous. Thus, our model can be
thought of as a special case of ‘social status’ if we relax the assumption that the
agents are fund managers. Moreover, some papers consider ‘catching up with the
Joneses’, for example Chan and Kogan (2002), which has a similar interpretation
regarding social status. Our paper thus captures some of the futures of those models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the model setup in
Section 3.2, and develop a benchmark case without relative performance in Section
3.3. Section 3.4 presents a general model with relative performance. Section 3.5
shows a special case when the risk aversion coefficient equals two, and analyzes the
characteristics of volatility, portfolio choices, stock prices and market prices of risks.
In Section 3.6, we numerically consider more special cases as a robustness check.
As an extension of this paper, Section 3.7 discusses the survivalship of irrational
traders when they care about relative performance. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The Model Setup
In this section, we first present the model setup for the economy including hetero-
geneous beliefs and the relative performance.
3.2.1 Economy
We consider a continuous time, finite horizon [0,T] economy with two assets that





= µs,tdt+ σs,tdBt (3.1)
where σs,t > 0 and Bt is the standard Brownian motion defined on the filtered
probability space (Ω,F , {Ft} ,P). Note that the Brownian motion Bt is the only
source of uncertainty in this economy. The drift µs,t and diffusion σs,t are determined
in equilibrium. The stock is in positive net supply and pays the liquidating dividend
DT at time T . We assume Dt follows a geometric Brownian motion
dDt
Dt
= µDdt+ σDdBt (3.2)
where µD and σD are positive constants. The risk-free asset, interpreted as a bond,
is in zero net supply and has a constant return r. For simplicity, we assume r = 0.
There are two groups of agents, interpreted as fund managers, in the market who
optimally allocate their fund between the risky and the risk-free assets. Each group
has infinite number of managers that form a continuum with measure 1. Because
there are two groups, with a little abuse of notations, we use subscript of i to denote
the manager in group i, i ∈ (1, 2)30. Each manager i invests a fraction, θi,t, of her
investment wealth Wi,t on the stock. Hence, Wi,t follows
dWi,t = θi,tWi,t (µs,tdt+ σs,tdBt) (3.3)
We assume that the managers have the same initial endowment, which means that
each manager has Wi,0 =
S0
2 initial wealth.
3.2.2 Relative Performance and Objective Function
In reality, two types of compensation contracts exist for fund managers: fixed (pro-
portional to Asset Under Management), or performance based. Under fixed contract,
managers care about fund flows, which according to empirical evidence31, depend
on a fund’s relative performance compared to peers. Under performance based con-
tract, a manager’s performance is compared to benchmarks that also include peer
performance. Consistent with the compensation contracts in the fund management
industry observed by Ma, Tang and Gomez (2012), we assume that the managers
receive a time T bonus or penalty that is related to their relative performance com-
paring to their peers. We assume that a manager receives bonus if her own type
30Thus, manager i means an individual manager who belongs to group i.
31Such as Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Huang, Wei and Yan (2007).
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beats the other type of managers, and suffers penalty if the other type beats her
own type of managers.
We define the functional form of the bonus/penalty in the following way: first de-
note Wi,T as the worth of manager i’s portfolio at time T , and Ri,T as the aggregate
return of all managers in group i relative to the aggregate return of all managers in






From our previous assumption, W1,0 = W2,0 =
S0




on the ratio of their performance because they start with the same initial wealth.
Then define the bonus/penalty as:
BPi,T = Wi,T (R
k
i,T − 1) (3.5)
where k > 1. If Wi,T > Wj,T , then Ri,T > 1 and BPi,T > 0, so that manager i
receives a bonus. If Wi,T < Wj,T , then Ri,T < 1 and BPi,T < 0, so that manager i
receives a penalty. The assumption k > 1 ensures the bonus/penalty is increasing
and convex in manager i’s relative performance, which is consistent with empiri-
cal results. Following this assumption, manager i’s wealth from investment plus
bonus/penalty adds up to Wi,T + BPi,T = Wi,TR
k
i,T , which is the objective in her
optimization problem. Denote fi,T := (Ri,T )







Manager i has the probability space
(
Ω,F i, {F it} ,P i). Following the standard fil-
tering theorem, the dividend process under fund manager i’s belief follows
dDt
Dt
= µi,Ddt+ σDdBi,t (3.7)
By Girsanov’s theorem, dBi,t = dBt + ηidt is the Brownian motion in manager i’s
probability space , and ηi =
µD−µi,D
σD
. For two groups of agents, 1 and 2, equation
(3.7) implies
dB2,t = dB1,t + µdt (3.8)







(3.9) represents the investors’ disagreement on the drift of the dividend process,
normalized by its diffusion term. µ > 0 implies that the agents in group 1 are more
optimistic and vice versa. Given the priors of agents, µ is an exogenous parameter.33
Under the subjective measures of groups 1 and 2, the stock has the dynamics
dSt = St[µs,tdt+ σs,tdBt]
= St[µi,tdt+ σs,tdBi,t], for i = 1, 2 (3.10)
The two groups of agents must agree with the price, so we have the relationship
between the perceived means
µ1,t − µ2,t = σs,tµ (3.11)
Because the market is complete, there exists a unique state price density process,









is the perceived market price of risk (Sharpe ratio) for group 1 and 2 respectively.
We also have κ1 − κ2 = µ which is the measure of the disagreement between the
agents’ perceived market price of risk.
3.3 The Benchmark Case: No Relative Performance (k = 0)
In this section, we analyze a benchmark case model as if there is no relative perfor-
mance; that is, k = 0. When k = 0, the indirect utility function, (3.6), becomes a








s.t. dWi,t = θi,tWi,t (µi,tdt+ σs,tdBi,t) (3.15)
33Details can be found from Basak (2004).
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This problem becomes the standard model with heterogeneous beliefs (e.g., Basak
2005).34 Solving the above problem, we show the optimal consumption and state
prices at time T in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1. When k = 0, the final wealth for the two agents are
W 01,T =
DT
1 + λ(T )
1
γ








The state prices at time T are
pi01,T =



















where yi is the Lagrange multiplier for manager i’s optimization problem, and pii,t
is the perceived state price density for manager i, and i = 1, 2.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
The superscript 0 means no relative performance (k = 0). (3.16) shows that two
groups of agents share the final dividend DT , and the sharing rule depends on λ(T )
1
γ .
(3.17) gives the state prices at time T . (3.18) shows the dynamics of λ(t) which is
the stochastic weight for the central planner’s problem (Basak (2005))35. By Ito’s











Given that the priors of two groups of agents, µ is exogenous, (3.19) and (3.20)
indicate that λ(t) is an exogenous process. Note that there is only one uncertainty
Bt in the economy; from (3.19) one can see that λ(t) has a one-to-one relationship
with Bt, and hence λ(t) can represent the status of the economy. In particular, λ(t)
is the opposite of the status of economy; for example, when the economy is good,
Bt has a large positive value (i.e., the stock price is high), while λ(t) has a rather
34However, in the model, agents only consume at time T which is different to Basak (2005) in
which agents consume continuously.
35The central planner’s problem is maxc1+c2=c u1(c1) + λ(t)u2(c2).
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small value.
Calibrating the equilibrium requires the explicit expression of state price density,
pii,t, which can be calculated as pii,t = E
i
t (pii,T ) by its martingale property. However,
the difficulty in calculating the expectation is the term (1 + λ(T )
1











when γ is an integer. Thus, we assume that γ is an integer and solve the equilibrium
in the following Proposition.





































































The market prices of risk are
κ01,t = γσD + δ
0
1,tµ
κ02,t = γσD − δ02,tµ
where δ01,t and δ
0
2,t are two functions of λ(t).

























where β01,t and β
0
2,t are two functions of λ(t)..
This proposition gives us the benchmark case without concerns about relative per-
formance, and all of our results will be compared to this benchmark. Given the state
prices, we can easily calculate the stock price, S0t , and the volatility, σ
0
s,t, which can
be found in Appendix 3 (when k = 0).
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3.4 The Model with Relative Performance
In this section, we solve the model with relative performance (k > 1) and compare
the equilibrium to the benchmark case. Given the indirect utility function, (3.6) ,








s.t. dWi,t = θi,tWi,t (µi,tdt+ σs,tdBi,t) (3.23)
By the standard martingale approach (Cox and Huang 1989), manager i’s optimiza-












Solving (3.25), we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.2. There is an unique equilibrium, where





where Ŵi,T is the optimal final wealth for individual manager i.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
Note that because there is infinite number of managers in group i, each manager
group i takes fi,T as given; hence, this equilibrium belongs to a competitive equilib-
rium. By the market clearing condition, W1,T +W2,T = DT , we can solve the final
wealth of each agent in Lemma 3.3.
Lemma 3.3. At time T, two agents share the final dividend DT
W1,T =
DT











where γ̂ = γ + 2k(γ − 1).
Proof. see Appendix 3.
Compared to the results in Lemma 1, two groups of managers still share the final
dividend DT . However, the sharing rule now depends on λ(T )
1




γ̂ is a function of k so that the relative performance affects the fraction of the final
dividend that is shared by the two groups. By choosing different values of γ, we
have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.4. When γ = 1 and γ̂ = γ, the relative performance has no effect; for
γ > 1, γ̂ > γ, we then have
when λ(T ) is small enough, W1,T < W
0
1,T and W2,T > W
0
2,T ;
when λ(T ) is large enough, W1,T > W
0
1,T and W2,T < W
0
2,T .
The case of γ = 1 refers to the log utility and the relative performance does not
matter in this case. When γ > 1, we have two scenarios that are conditional on
the realizations of λ(T ). As mentioned before, a small λ(T ) corresponds to a good
economy and a large λ(T ) corresponds to a bad economy. The results show that
in a very good economy, the wealth of the optimistic group is lower than it is in
the benchmark case, and in the very bad economy, the opposite is true. Note
that the optimistic group of agents is dominant in the very good economy, and the
pessimistic group of agents is dominant in the very bad economy. We can then draw
the conclusion that the relative performance decreases the impact of the dominant
group of agents in the extreme economy.





















Proof. see Appendix 3.
Similar to the benchmark case in the last section, the term (1 +λ(T )
1










γ̂ when γ is an integer. We then provide the equilibrium
in the following Proposition.


































































The market prices of risk are
κ1,t = γσD + δ1,tµ
κ2,t = γσD − δ2,tµ.







































































and the volatility is
σs,t = σD +Ktµ (3.31)
Note that δ1,t, δ2,t, β1,t, β2,t and Kt are shown in Appendix 3.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
Compared to the results in Proposition 3.1, we can see that all of the equilibrium
quantities are affected by the relative performance k. The relative performance af-
fects β1,t, β2,t, δ1,t , δ2,t and Kt in the stock holdings, the Sharpe ratio and the
volatility. These parameters are all at play through the disagreement parameter,
µ. Thus, the relative performance affects those quantities that are generated by the
difference of opinions.
To analyze the effects of the relative performance, we consider a special case with
γ = 2 as an example, where the equilibrium can be analyzed in more detail.36 For
a robustness check, in Section 3.6, we also analyze those cases when γ = 3, 4.
36The approach of using an integer for the risk aversion coefficient is the same as Yan (2008) who
uses numerical simulation to analyze the equilibrium. Rather than doing the numerical study, we
choose a special case with γ = 2.
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3.5 Special Case: γ = 2
In this section, we solve the equilibrium by choosing γ = 2. The purpose of this
section is to compare the equilibrium with relative performance to that without rel-
ative performance. Because we can solve everything in closed form, the comparative
statics are also analyzed in this section.
3.5.1 Stock Holdings
The following proposition shows the portfolio choices for the managers.






















β1,t and β2,t are functions of k, which can be found in Appendix 3.
Proof. The proof is in see Appendix 3.
From (3.32) and (3.33), the optimal stock holdings consist of three terms. The first
terms is the traditional Merton (1971) myopic demand without heterogeneous be-






term is for hedging against variation in market price of risk κi,t caused by heteroge-




for hedging against the heterogeneous belief itself, hereafter called the heterogeneity
hedging demand. From (3.27), we can see that the two groups of agents share the
final dividend DT , and the fraction depends on λ(T )
1
γ̂ . Given the realization of
different states, the agents have state dependent shares of wealth. For example, the
optimistic group of agents has larger fraction of wealth than the pessimistic group
when the economy is good. For this reason, the additional uncertainty originating
from different opinions generates heterogeneity demand. Note that the parameter of
the relative performance, k, affects δi,t, βi,t and σs,t, hence affects both the variation
hedging demand and the heterogeneity hedging demand.
37Without heterogeneous demand, µ = 0, then risk premium and volatility are both constants,
so is the myopic demand.
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3.5.2 Comparison to the Benchmark Case
To analyze the effect of relative performance, we need to compare βi,t to the bench-
mark case.
Proposition 3.4. The following relationships hold:
θ1,t − θ2,t = µ [1− (β1,t + β2,t)] (3.34)
β1,t + β2,t − (β01,t + β02,t) > 0 (3.35)
moreover,
d (β1,t + β2,t)
dk
> 0 (3.36)
Proof. see Appendix 3.
(3.34) shows that the difference in the two groups of agents’ stock holdings only
depends on the betas, and is decreasing in β1,t+β2,t, and (3.35) shows that β1,t+β2,t
is greater than in the benchmark case. Thus, with relative performance, two agents
trade more similarly than they do without relative performance. (3.36) shows that
the more important the relative performance is, the more similarly the managers
trade. The following corollary shows the case when the relative performance is
infinitely strong (k →∞).
Corollary 3.1. The difference between two demands goes to zero when k →∞.
Proof. One can show that both β1,t and β2,t are smaller than
1
2 . Thus, given (3.36),
we have the above corollary.
Intuitively, when concerns of the relative performance are infinitely strong, the dif-
ference of opinions goes to zero; hence, the two groups of agents trade like one group.
We also show how the heterogeneity hedging demand of each manager changes with
respect to the relative performance in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. For both agents, there exist cutoffs, gc1 < gc2
Case1 : when λ (t) < gc1 ; β1,t > β
0
1,t , β2,t < β
0
2,t
Case2 : when λ (t) > gc2 ; β1,t < β
0
1,t , β2,t > β
0
2,t
Case3 : when gc1 < λ (t) < gc2 ; β1,t > β
0
1,t , β2,t > β
0
2,t
Proof. see Appendix 3.
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We compare the heterogeneity hedging demand with and without the relative per-
formance conditional on λ(t). The results are intuitive because the realization of
λ(T ) determines the fraction of wealth allocated to each agent, which is shown by
(3.27). We use the following figure to illustrate the three cases in the proposition.
Figure 3.1: The difference of β with relative performance to that without relative
performance.
Figure 3.1 gives the graphical illustration of the proposition. It shows how the
difference of heterogeneity hedging demands with and without relative performance
changes with respect to λ(t). We discuss each case separately.
Case 1 indicates the situation in which both groups of agents believe that the
economy is good. The reason is shown in the following. Compared to the case
without relative performance, the heterogeneity hedging demand of the optimistic
(pessimistic) agent is higher (lower). From the results of Lemma 3.5, when λ(T ) is
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small, W1,T < W
0
1,T and W2,T > W
0
2,T . Given that λ(t) is small, the possibility that
W1,T < W
0
1,T and W2,T > W
0
2,T is high. On expectation, the pessimistic group of
agents will have the larger share of wealth than in the case without relative perfor-
mance. Consequently, the optimistic (pessimistic) group of agents will have a lesser
(greater) fraction of wealth so that she needs to have a larger heterogeneity hedging
demand.
Case 2 indicates the situation in which both groups of agents believe that the econ-
omy is bad. Following the same logic as in case 1, given that λ(t) is large, the
possibility that W1,T > W
0
1,T and W2,T < W
0
2,T is high. The optimistic group of
agents will end up with higher fraction of wealth and will hence have less hetero-
geneity hedging demand.
Note that the definition of a ‘good economy’ and a ‘bad economy’is subjective con-
sidering the two types of investors’ beliefs. In case 3, the optimistic group of agents
believes that the economy is ‘good’, and the pessimistic group of agents believes
that it is ‘bad’.38 Thus, regarding the expectations over the subjective belief, the
possibility that W1,T < W
0
1,T and W2,T < W
0
2,T is high for the optimistic and the
pessimistic groups of agents, respectively. In this range, both groups of agents have
a higher heterogeneity hedging demand.
3.5.3 Market Price of Risk (Sharpe Ratio)
The following proposition shows the Sharpe ratios with/without relative perfor-
mance.
Proposition 3.6. When γ = 2, the market prices of risk are
κ1,t = 2σD + akµ ; κ2,t = 2σD − (1− ak)µ (3.37)
where ak is a function of k and is shown in Appendix 3. Moreover, the market prices
of risk in the benchmark case are:
κ01,t = 2σD + a0µ ; κ
0
2,t = 2σD − (1− a0)µ (3.38)
38There is no other possibility (e.g. the pessimistic agent believes the economy is good, and
optimistic one believes bad.) given the priors of two agents because the optimistic agent, by
definition, is always more ‘optimistic’ than the pessimistic one.
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Then we have
Case1 : when λ(t) < exp[−2µσD (T − t)] ,ak > a0 , and ∂ak
∂k
> 0
Case2 : when λ(t) > exp[−2µσD (T − t)] ,ak < a0 , and ∂ak
∂k
< 0
Proof. see Appendix 3.
(3.37) shows that some risk is actually transferred from the pessimistic agents to
the optimistic agents because κ1,t − κ2,t = µ. This result is standard for asset pric-
ing with heterogeneous beliefs. Given that ak is a function of k, we know that the
transferred risk is affected by the relative performance. (3.38) gives Sharpe ratios
without relative performance (k = 0), so the analysis depends on the comparison
between ak and a0, which is shown in the two cases of the proposition.
Similar to the analysis of the stock holdings, case 1 corresponds to a good econ-
omy. We show that the market price of risk with relative performance is higher than
without relative performance, and the more important the relative performance, the
higher the market price of risk. In case 2 (a bad economy), the market price of risk
with relative performance is smaller than it is without relative performance, and
the more important the relative performance, the smaller the market price of risk.
We have above results because: when the economy is good, the optimistic group of
agents possesses less wealth with relative performance than they do without relative
performance. Although the optimistic group of agents still dominates the market,
the stock is less overvalued with relative performance. Hence, the market price
of risk is higher with relative performance than it is without relative performance.
When the economy is bad, by a similar logic, the market price of risk is smaller with
relative performance than it is without relative performance.




> 0 , i = 1, 2 (3.39)
Proof. see Appendix 3.
(3.39) shows that Sharpe ratios of both groups of agents are counter-cyclical. Intu-
itively, when the market is good, the optimistic agents dominate the market so that
the stock is overvalued. The excess return is lower, hence the Sharpe ratio is lower.
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3.5.4 Stock Price and Volatility
In this section, we solve the equilibrium price and the volatility and compare these
to the benchmark case.


















































Denote S0t as the stock price when k = 0; then we have
Case1 : when λ(t)→ 0, St < S0t
Case2 : when λ(t)→∞, St > S0t
Proof. see Appendix 3.
(3.40) shows the expression of the stock price, and we compare it to the benchmark
case price, S0t , in two extreme cases. Case 1 and case 2 depend on the process λ(t),
so we have a similar interpretation to that of the stock holdings. In case 1, λ(t)→ 0,
so we interpret it as the extremely good economy. We show that the stock price is
lower with the relative performance than without the relative performance. Case 2
is interpreted as the extremely bad economy, and the stock price is higher with the
relative performance than without.
When λ(t) is small, the aggregate demands are lower than in the benchmark case.
When λ(t) is large, the aggregate demands are higher. Given that the stock has a
fixed supply, the price is lower in case 1 and higher in case 2 relative to the bench-
mark case. Figure 3.2 explains this proposition.
From the graph below and the proposition, we can see that when λ(t) is very large
(a very bad economy), the stock price is higher than the benchmark case. When λ(t)
is very small (a very good economy), the stock price is lower. For the middle range
of λ(t), the stock price can be either higher or lower than it is in the benchmark
case. Note that the middle range corresponds to case 3 in proposition 5 in which
both agents disagree with the ‘good’ or the ‘bad’ economies.
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Figure 3.2: The comparison of stock prices with and without relative performance
for different λ. The model parameters are σD = 0.3, µ = 1, k = 1.5







This corollary is an extension of Corollary 3.1. When k → ∞, we know that,
from Corollary 3.1, both groups of agents submit the same demand so that the
economy is the same as the economy with one representative investor. Moreover,
this investor has the average belief, µ1+µ22 , regarding the dividend process. As a
result, we have the stock price in the corollary.



























































































Comparing the volatility with relative performance, σs,t, to the benchmark case σ
0
s,t,
there exist two cutoffs, dc1 and dc2, where dc1 < dc2.




Case2 : When λ(t) < dc1 or λ(t) > dc2 , σs,t > σ
0
s,t
Moreover, the larger the k is, the larger the dc2− dc1 is.
Proof. see Appendix 3.
From (3.41), the volatility with relative performance is greater than σD. That is,
the difference of opinions generates excess volatility. In case 1, λ(t) has upper and
lower bounds so that we interpret it as normal days (the economy is not very good
or very bad). We show that the volatility is smaller with relative performance than
the volatility without relative performance. Case 2 indicates an extreme economy
(very good or very bad); we show that the volatility is larger with relative perfor-
mance than that without relative performance. Moreover, the stronger the relative
performance is (the large k), the wider the range of the normal days is. Figure 3.3
depicts the numerical simulations.
The relative performance leads the two groups of agents to trade more similarly,
which has two effects on the volatility. First, it makes managers trade more simi-
larly to each other, hence, it has the direct effect of decreasing the volatility. This
effect is dominant in the middle range of the economy. Second, it decreases the
wealth (and impact) of the dominant group of agents, which in turn increases the
volatility. For example, when the economy is extremely good, the optimistic agents
dominate the market. We can imagine that the pessimistic agents are driven out of
the market when they lose a lot of money. Thus, only the optimistic agents survive
in the market. As a result, the difference in opinions is not reflected on the market,
hence no excess volatility. However, with concerns regarding relative performance,
the pessimistic agents trade more like the optimistic agents, so they can stay in the
market even when the economy is extremely good39. The existence of pessimistic
agents exaggerates the effects caused by the difference of opinions and hence results
in excess volatility.
39The similar story holds for the extremely bad economy and the pessimistic agent.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of volatilities with and without relative performance. Volatil-
ity vs. the value of λ(t). σk and σ0 denote the volatility with and without relative
performance, respectively. Choose different k for different graphs. Other model pa-
rameters are σD = 0.3, µ = 1
Overall, in normal days, the first effect dominates the second one so that the volatil-
ity with relative performance is smaller. In extreme cases, the second effect domi-
nates the first so that the volatility is larger. The stronger the concerns regarding
relative performance, the more similarly the agents trade; as a result, the range of
normal days becomes wider. This result is shown by the changes in the middle range
(increasing) from the first to the fourth graph in Figure 3.3. However, when k goes
to infinity, we have the one agent economy again which is shown in the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.3. When k →∞, σs,t → σD.
It is easy to see that, in (3.41), the expression in the bracket is between 0 and 1 so
that when k → ∞, σs,t → σD. The intuition is similar to those in Corollary 3.1
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and Corollary 3.2. When the relative performance is infinitely strong, we have the
representative agent economy.
3.6 More Special Cases
In Section 3.5, we use one special case with γ = 2 to illustrate our general model.
However, to show that our general model works for more cases, we do some numeri-
cal studies using different risk aversion parameters. In particular, we use the results
in Proposition 3.2 (the general case) by choosing γ = 3 and 4 and simulating the
volatilities in the different cases.
Note that we use the volatility as the embodiment of more cases because it can
best illustrate the theory in a normal and an extreme economy. Similar to the
special case when γ = 2, the volatility with relative performance is smaller than
the volatility without relative performance on normal days. The result reflects the
smaller difference of opinions that is dominant on normal days. However, in the
extreme economy, the wealth decrease for the dominant agents is substantial.
Figure 3.4: Comparison of volatilities with and without relative performance for γ =
3. σk and σ0 denote the volatility with and without relative performance, respectively.
Other model parameters are k = 1.5, σD = 0.3, µ = 1.
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of volatilities with and without relative performance for γ =
4. σk and σ0 denote the volatility with and without relative performance, respectively.
Other model parameters are k = 1.5, σD = 0.3, µ = 1.
3.7 The Irrational Traders’ Survivalship
In this section, we discuss one important implication for our model, i.e., the survival
of irrational traders in the long run. Without a loss of generality, we suppose that
the first group of agents has a rational belief and is always right about the economy.
The second group has an irrational belief, but both groups of traders care about their
performance relative to each other. We relax our assumption that µ > 0 so that the
irrational traders can be either optimistic or pessimistic. Importantly, µ represents
the extent of the wrong opinions that the irrational traders hold. Intuitively, the
larger the absolute value of µ, the more unlikely that the irrational traders will
survive in the long run. In this paper, we define the extinction of a group of traders






From the competitive equilibrium derived in Section 3.4, we have the following
Proposition.
40For further discussion of this definition, please refer to Kogan, Ross, Wang and Westerfield
(2006).
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Proposition 3.10. Define µ∗ := −2σD (γ̂ − 1), where γ̂ = γ + 2k (γ − 1). For
γ > 1 and µ 6= µ∗, only one of the traders survives in the long run. In particular,
we have:
µ > 0, pessimistic irrational trader ⇒Rational trader survives
µ∗ < µ < 0, moderately optimistic irrational trader ⇒Irrational trader survives
µ < µ∗, strongly optimistic irrational trader ⇒Rational trader survives
Proof. see Appendix 3.
Note that for µ = µ∗, both the rational and the irrational traders survive. This
proposition identifies three distinct regions regarding the extent of the wrong opin-
ions µ. In particular, the range in which the irrational trader survives depends on
µ∗. Note that in the benchmark case (k = 0 ), µ∗ = −2σD (γ − 1).
Corollary 3.4. The range of µ for the irrational trader to survive (µ∗, 0) is larger
in the case of relative performance than it is without relative performance.
Proof. By the expression of γ̂ and Proposition 3.10, we can easily get the result.
The above Corollary is consistent with our results, i.e., because both types of traders
care about their relative performance and hence they trade more similarly, the group
of the irrational traders has a higher probability of survival.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper studies an equilibrium asset pricing model in which institutional in-
vestors with heterogeneous beliefs care about their relative performance. We focus
on the investor’s stock holdings, the asset prices, the volatility and the market price
of risk. Relative performance leads the agents to trade more similarly. On the
one hand, this similarity lowers the stock volatility. On the other hand, relative
performance decreases the wealth of the dominant agents and increases the stock
volatility. Combining the two effects, in this paper, we show that the volatility is
smaller with relative performance than that without relative performance in normal
economy; and larger in the extreme economy. The asset price is lower with rela-
tive performance than without relative performance when the economy is extremely
good; it is higher when the economy is extremely bad. The model shows that the
stock holdings for both groups of agents can be decomposed into myopic demand,
variation hedging demand and heterogeneity hedging demand. The heterogeneity
hedging demand is influenced by the relative performance. When the economy is
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good, the market risk premium is higher relative to the case without relative per-
formance; it is lower when the economy is bad. As an application of our model, we
show that irrational traders tend to have a higher survival probability with relative
performance concerns because they tend to trade similarly to the rational traders.
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3.10 Appendix 3: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
3.1. Proof of Lemma 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5











− Ei (pii,tWi,T )
]
(3.43)
By FOC, we have W−γi,T (fi,T )
1−γ = (yipii,T ), so in equilibrium, we will have:

























where λ(T ) =
y1pi1,T
y2pi2,T
and γ̂ = γ + 2k(γ − 1). Together with the market clearing
clearing conditions, W1,T +W2,T = DT , we get the (3.27) in Lemma 3.3. (3.16) in
Lemma 3.1 is just a special case of (3.27). Together with the FOC (which shows
the relationship between Wi,T and pii,T ), we can solve pii,T in Lemma 3.5.
3.2. Proof of Proposition 3.2 and 3.9:
State Prices


























































Given the dynamics of λ(t) and Dt w.r.t. B1,t, we have





(T − t)− µ (B1,T −B1,t)
]
(3.49)







(T − t) + σD (B1,T −B1,t)
]
(3.50)

































by pi1,t = E
1





























Similarly, for the dynamics w.r.t B2,t, we have




(T − t)− µ (B2,T −B2,t)
]
(3.53)







(T − t) + σD (B2,T −B2,t)
]
(3.54)






























Market Price of Risk
By Ito’s lemma on pi1,t and matching the diffusion terms, we can get Market price
of risk



























− i+ k(γ − 1)
γ + 2k(γ − 1)µ− γσD
)





















































































































For agent 1, we have pi1,tW1,t = E
1



































































































































































































































































































 (T − t)
, then
for diffusion term, we only need to consider dXtYt =
YtdXt−XtdYt
Y 2t
. Apply Ito’s Lemma
to calculate diffusion terms of dXt and dYt.





































γ+2k(γ−1) i+ k(γ − 1)




























































































then, we can get the expression in the proposition.
Similarly, by setting γ = 2, we can get (3.41). Thus, Proposition 3.9 is proved.
3.3. Proof of Proposition 3.3





























































3.4. Proof of Proposition 3.4









and b = µ
2









































. By some manipulation, we
can write the difference between two investors’ portfolio choices as
θ1,t − θ2,t = µ
σs,t
[
1− (βk1,t + βk2,t)
]






For this reason, relative performance’s effect on portfolio choice depends on βk1,t +




























1 + e−b+a + eb+a + e2a
(3.65)
If we use notation AB − CD for above expression, its sign depends on AD−CB, which





























































Then we can conclude
βk1,t + β
k




















































































































































It is easy to see that the above expression is greater than 0.
3.5. Proof of Proposition 3.5
Given βi,t in the proof of Proposition 3.3, we can easily get β
0
i,t by setting k=0.


















































































































(x) < 0, F (x) is a mono-






(x) > 0, F (x) is a
monotonically increasing function of x. For this reason, there exist one cutoff xc1,
when x > xc1, F (x) < 0, when x < xc1, F (x) > 0


















































































































x−2 = 0 (3.75)














(x) < 0, G(x) is a








(x) > 0, G(x)
is a monotonically increasing function of x. Consequently, there exist one cutoff xc2,
when x > xc2, G(x) > 0, when x < xc2, G(x) > 0.

















, we have: xc2 < 1. In addition,









, we have: xc1 > 1. To sum up,
xc1 > xc2. Let gc1 := x
2
c1e
(−µσD)(T−t) and gc2 := x2c2e(−µσD)(T−t), Proposition 3.5
is proved.
3.6. Proof of Proposition 3.6

































































If ak ≥ (≤)a0,then ak1−ak ≥ (≤)
a0









































































































































































































































































Hence, in this case, ak1−ak >
a0
1−a0 , and it is easy to show that ak > a0.
If λ(t)
1




















































































































In this case ak1−ak −
a0
1−a0 < 0, it is easy to show ak < a0.










































Let a = µσD (T − t), b = µ
2




∂k . After some calculation, we
















































1+k − 1 > 0 , then a > 0, and the above expression is smaller than zero. If
e
a




the same sign with ∂ak∂k , the proposition is thus proved.
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where exp(a) = λ(t)
1
2 exp (µσD) (T − t), b = µ
2
8 .
Since κ1,t − κ2,t is a constant, it is easy to show dκ2,tdλ(t) > 0.
3.8. Proof of Proposition 3.8
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2 by setting γ = 2, we can get (3.40). When
k = 0, we have S0t =








































(T − t). For Skt ≤






, we need to look at the sign of Xkt Y
0
t − Y kt X0t



























































































































where K = λ(t)eµσD(T−t). After some calculation, the sign of Xkt Y 0t −Y kt X0t depends
on
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Then when K →∞, St > S0t . When K → 0, St < S0t
































Using the strong Law of Large Numbers for Brownian motion (see Karatzas and
Shreve (1991), for any value of σ, we have:
lim
T→∞
exp(aT + σBT ) =
{
0, a < 0










0,−12µ2 − µσD (γ̂ − 1) < 0
∞,−12µ2 − µσD (γ̂ − 1) > 0
}
(3.86)
then we can easily get the result in the proposition.
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